Negotiations are currently underway to end the war in Ukraine and to strike a new nuclear deal with Iran. In Ukraine, the United States has reportedly proposed a settlement that would recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea de jure and its occupation of eastern Ukraine de facto. In Iran, talks have made progress; however, should they fail, President Trump has suggested that a military strike against Iran remains on the table.
Iran is Turkey’s eastern neighbor, and Ukraine lies just across the Black Sea to the north. Given this proximity and high stakes for Turkey, it would seem natural for Ankara to play a role in these diplomatic efforts. Yet despite closely monitoring developments in both theaters, Turkey remains notably absent from the negotiation tables. Several reasons help explain why.
1. Hard Power Still Matters
Over the past decade, Turkey’s most assertive foreign policy moves have been backed by hard power. Ankara’s recent foreign policy achievements have largely been tied to military deployments, arms exports, and backing factions in civil conflicts. Its role in the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, its intervention in support of a friendly regime in Tripoli, and its arms sales to Ethiopia and Sudan have all bolstered Turkey’s regional influence and strategic weight.
In contrast, Turkey has no comparable leverage over Iran. It neither supplies weapons to Tehran nor maintains any military presence in the country. While Turkey has provided arms to Ukraine, its contribution pales in comparison to the military and financial support offered by European countries and the UK, which amounts to tens of billions of dollars — not to mention the far greater assistance provided by the United States. Without the ability to project force, Turkey’s diplomatic influence remains limited.
2. Turkey’s Influence Has Natural Limits
Despite the ambitious rhetoric often heard from Ankara, Turkey’s real ability to shape major regional developments remains constrained. As a middle power, it tends to act boldly when it senses great powers are distracted — but carefully enough to avoid direct confrontation.
Turkey successfully mediated between Somalia and Ethiopia last year because it had good relations with both countries — and because no major power was competing for influence there. Similarly, Turkey capitalized on Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine and Iran’s weakened hand following the war in Gaza to overthrow Assad in Syria.
The negotiations on Ukraine and Iran, however, are firmly led by the Trump administration, which is not really open to multilateral efforts. With Washington keeping a tight grip on the process, there is little space for Turkey to get involved.
3. Turkey’s Position Is Taken for Granted
From Ankara’s perspective, a settlement that restores security is far preferable to prolonged conflict in Ukraine. Ankara supports a diplomatic outcome that would prevent Ukraine from falling fully under Russian domination. At the same time, a military escalation in the Iranian Gulf could be catastrophic for Turkey’s economy and would further destabilize the broader region. For Ankara, de-escalation on both fronts is clearly the preferred path.
Besides, unlike Israel, which has sometimes derailed deals it opposed, Turkey lacks the capacity to disrupt negotiations. In short, Ankara’s general support is assumed — but that alone is not enough to guarantee it a seat at the table.
4. Iran’s Frustration with Ankara
Turkey might have played a symbolic role in the Iran talks, just as it did alongside Brazil in the early 2010s. It could have hosted early meetings, like Rome and Oman did this time, or Iran could have made a courtesy visit to Ankara, as it did with China and Russia.
But the regional context has changed dramatically. Turkey’s role in helping to topple Assad — Iran’s key ally in the region — has severely damaged relations. From Tehran’s perspective, Turkey’s actions in Syria amount to a hostile takeover of a strategic partner. Given this backdrop, Iran is unlikely to extend any diplomatic gestures toward Turkey for the foreseeable future.
5. The Changing European Approach to Ukraine
In the Ukrainian negotiations, Ankara initially found a more receptive audience. Ukraine appreciated Turkey’s willingness to contribute troops to a potential peacekeeping force.
When Britain and several European countries seriously considered forming such a force, Turkey was invited to key meetings and summits.
However, enthusiasm for the idea has faded. European capitals have grown increasingly wary of the risks, and as they step back from the peacekeeping plan, Turkey’s potential role has waned as well. Ankara’s services, once seen as valuable, are simply no longer required at this stage.
Ankara’s ambitions to act as a regional power are clear. Watching events unfold from a distance is not its preferred role — but for now, it is the only one available. Without the necessary leverage or the trust of the key players, Turkey’s influence remains limited.
This pattern is not confined to Ukraine and Iran. In other regional theaters — from Gaza to the Balkans — Turkey’s diplomatic footprint has also diminished in recent years. The broader question is whether Turkey will increasingly rely on defense ties as a substitute for diplomatic influence.
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