In the wake of the March 31 elections, in which the Turkish opposition secured a clear victory against the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish politics have entered an era of détente between the government and the opposition. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Özgür Özel, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader, visited each other's headquarters and came together on ceremonial occasions. As an unprecedented case of rapprochement between the two poles of politics, this friendly environment had to provide an opportunity for dialogue and compromise. Nevertheless, the détente has so far failed to offer any improvement in terms of democracy and human rights in Turkey. It seems to soften the opposition when Erdogan is most vulnerable due to deep economic troubles and popular discontent.
In the recent local elections on March 31, the CHP won almost all metropolises, including the three big cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Yet, the CHP’s success has not been limited to industrialized urban areas and the western coast which is traditionally more secular and nationalist. Even central and eastern Anatolia has witnessed exceptional opposition wins – a breakthrough that shows that the AKP’s ground is shaky and shifting through the opposition. This trend is also reflected in recent polls showing the CHP leading the AKP in the popular vote.
The détente between the AKP and the CHP has begun in the wake of such a devastating election for Erdogan. Özel visited President Erdogan at the AKP headquarters in May, and Erdogan paid a return visit a month later. It was Erdogan’s first visit to CHP headquarters in 18 years. The two leaders also attended the 50th-year ceremonies of the Cyprus War. It was a meaningful gesture as the 1974 Cyprus war was initiated by a coalition of CHP and Milli Selamet Partisi, which belongs to the same political tradition as the AKP. Özel also gave an interview to pro-government daily Sabah.
In the highly polarized context of Turkish politics, such contacts provide opportunities for compromise and normalization but so far it has fallen short of meeting expectations. AKP-CHP détente has not done any favor for thousands of political prisoners, except for a few former generals who were close to the CHP. Özel may convince Erdogan to release a few other high-profile detainees, like Osman Kavala. Yet, the cases of thousands of others are not even on the table. The détente has not served freedom of speech either. Last week, the government briefly banned Instagram for unconvincing reasons. It removed its ban on Instagram after the latter reportedly accepted Turkey’s conditions that allow stricter government control over the contents. The government has also arrested a woman who criticized the government in a social media interview for criticizing the ban. As the government has established tight control over the conventional media, social media interviews have become the major avenue for ordinary people to express their discontent. This narrowing space for free speech and democracy in Turkey makes a stark contrast with AKP-CHP détente.
As a matter of fact, the logic behind the AKP-CHP rapprochement is hardly a quest for a return to democracy and human rights. For Erdogan, the dialogue with the CHP leader allows him to gain some time for economic troubles and to balance against the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Economic recovery is one of the major items on Erdogan’s agenda. So far, despite the criticisms from his own base and supporters, he has not backed down from the harsh economic program that includes high taxation and high interests. Erdogan and his close circle are aware that the economic downturn undermines AKP and consequently Erdogan’s power base. With a tight economic regime, they may solve some structural problems in the economy before the 2028 elections. However, this tight regime, which mainly relies on high taxes and interest rates, badly hurts ordinary people and causes discontent. In this context, Erdogan has softened the opposition discourse by initiating a political dialogue with the CHP.
Second, Erdogan’s détente with Özel enables him to balance against the MHP. President Erdogan has always formed coalitions to pit his enemies against each other. He first aligned with liberals, the Gulen Movement, and the Kurds against the Kemalists. When he thought the Movement was too powerful and Kemalists were sufficiently weak, he isolated Gulenists by allying with their rivals. When he believed Kurds became a liability, he allied with the nationalists. The AKP-MHP alliance has then severely persecuted the Gulenists and Kurds. Yet, now, Erdogan clearly believes that the MHP is too powerful within his regime. He wants to truncate its power and establish his control over the party dynamics of its junior partner. To that end, he does not have too many options to ally with other than the CHP. After all, CHP seems to be quite a volunteer for such a role. Özel, to illustrate, gives special attention to the court case of the assassination of Sinan Ateş which implicates MHP leadership. He asked Erdogan to meet with Ateş’s wife who demanded full retribution from MHP leaders. Thus, Özel believes that an AKP-CHP rapprochement could potentially dismantle the AKP-MHP power coalition, thereby creating an opportunity for the CHP.
Mitigating Erdogan’s authoritarian bedevilments against the CHP municipalities is another possible concern in Özel’s calculations. As Erdogan has consolidated his authoritarian rule for years, confrontation with him can be costly for the CHP. Erdogan can raise difficulties for CHP municipalities, arrest their popular mayors, and appoint government trustees to remove them. Instead of conflict, dialogue can protect CHP gains in recent elections. After all, the economic crisis is already doing its worst for the government. So, CHP leadership thinks, the opposition should provide good governance with municipalities while waiting for crisis in the economy to drive Erdogan out of office.
AKP-CHP détente seems to be another phase in Turkish politics that does not necessarily mean democratization. Erdogan is buying time to manage the economy and social content. He also uses the CHP to balance against the MHP. CHP, on the other hand, wants to maintain its gains. If the détente dissolves the AKP-MHP coalition, it would be the cherry on the cake for Özel.
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