Opposing authoritarian leaders is a formidable challenge, as they wield state resources to suppress dissent. Over two decades, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has methodically dismantled democratic institutions and consolidated authoritarian power. His power is unrivaled, yet not unchallenged. In 2024, his party faced major setbacks in local elections, and growing economic hardship, public discontent, and internal coalition tensions present significant hurdles. However, despite occasional victories and moments of promise, the opposition remains fragmented, timid, and reactive—allowing Erdogan to dictate the political agenda with little resistance. Its singular focus on elections, rather than sustained political struggle, paradoxically weakens and paralyzes it.
President Erdogan still faces significant obstacles on his path to full authoritarianism. In 2024, his party suffered a decisive defeat in local elections. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) outperformed Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) by more than two percentage points in the national vote and secured a sweeping victory, capturing nearly all of Turkey’s major metropolitan cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The CHP even made inroads into central and eastern Anatolia, traditionally strongholds of conservative parties. Furthermore, charismatic CHP mayors Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas have emerged as formidable contenders for the next presidential election.
The economy remains Erdogan’s biggest challenge. While his austerity measures, implemented since May 2023, have shown some positive effects, the burden falls mostly on ordinary citizens. Rising living costs continue to fuel public discontent against the AKP and Erdogan. Adding to this frustration, the extravagant lifestyles of senior AKP figures further intensify resentment.
The government's corruption and mismanagement become most apparent during natural disasters. In the 2023 earthquakes, which devastated more than 10 cities, the AKP’s response was slow and ineffective. Even two years later, many promises to victims remain unfulfilled. The latest disaster struck on January 21, when a fire at a winter resort—fueled by corruption and negligence—claimed 78 lives. Similarly, recurring forest fires, floods, and other crises have repeatedly exposed the AKP’s incompetence.
The war in Gaza has posed another challenge for Erdogan, who has allowed Turkey’s trade with Israel to continue. For years, he has leveraged the Palestinian cause in both domestic and foreign policy to bolster his popularity. However, his political confrontations with Israel have never translated into economic disengagement. Even months after the Gaza war—which claimed at least 47,000 Palestinian lives—trade between Turkey and Israel has continued to grow. This contradiction has raised doubts among Erdogan’s core supporters, with some Islamist groups even daring to publicly protest his government’s stance.
Moreover, the AKP no longer holds a majority in Parliament. In recent elections, Erdogan’s party has repeatedly fallen short of securing full control, forcing him to rely on a coalition with Devlet Bahçeli’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). As a result, Erdogan lacks the parliamentary votes needed to pass constitutional amendments or call for a snap election—both of which could pave the way for extending his presidency beyond the current term.
To make matters worse, Erdogan is also facing tensions with his coalition partner, Bahçeli. Since the 2016 coup attempt, the MHP has expanded its influence over the security bureaucracy and judiciary, creating friction between the two allies. This growing power struggle manifests in court battles, bureaucratic maneuvering, and symbolic acts of defiance.
Given all this, one would expect Erdoğan to stumble and lose at least some of his power. He should have faced growing resistance and pushback from the opposition on multiple fronts, and there should have been more internal questioning and soul-searching within the AKP ranks. At the very least, he would be expected to be in a weaker position than after his electoral defeat in 2024. Yet, on the contrary, Erdoğan continues to dominate the political scene, set the agenda, command attention, and further tighten his grip on the country.
Why is the opposition so weak and ineffective vis-à-vis Erdogan?
Undoubtedly, as one of the longest-serving leaders in the world, President Erdoğan has consolidated an unprecedented amount of power. Beyond his absolute control over the civil bureaucracy, Erdoğan subdued the Turkish military through extensive purges following the 2016 coup attempt. He also exerts control over judiciary and enjoys significant influence over the media, the business world, and civil society. This vast network of influence allows Erdoğan to manipulate Turkish politics at will. If politics were a chessboard, Erdoğan could move multiple pieces simultaneously, crafting complex strategies and making his intentions harder to discern. For instance, while he accuses the CHP of cooperating with the PKK, he can engage in dialogue with the group himself with little political cost. Meanwhile, he can dismiss CHP and Kurdish mayors on extrajudicial grounds, accusing them of ties to the PKK.
In response, the opposition remains inconsistent and passive, while simultaneously expecting a victory—defeating Erdoğan in the presidential elections—in the most secure, painless, and effortless way possible. For years, the CHP attempted to counter Erdoğan’s populism with an anti-populist stance rooted in elitism, secularism, and the primacy of military bureaucracy. However, this strategy failed to resonate in elections. In recent years, CHP leaders have attempted to confront Erdoğan using his own weapon: populism. The CHP has, either directly or indirectly, embraced anti-refugee nationalism, foreign policy activism, and social justice rhetoric. Control over the major city municipalities allows the CHP to showcase its governance in contrast to the AKP's corruption. Under the leadership of charismatic mayors like Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, this populist discourse has helped the opposition build a broad coalition, uniting secular, conservative, and Kurdish sectors of society. This discourse is also politically safer, as it makes Erdoğan's judicial persecution of opposition figures more challenging. However, it is still insufficient to effectively push back against Erdoğan.
Of course, the CHP leaders aim to maintain this populist momentum by nominating one of their charismatic figures—İmamoğlu, Yavaş, or possibly Özgür Özel—against Erdoğan in the 2028 elections. The party pursued a similar strategy in the 2023 elections, but many dissident politicians and observers believe the CHP lost due to choosing the wrong candidate. CHP’s 2023 presidential candidate, and former leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, is an Alawite, an Islamic sect viewed as heretical by many Sunnis. For 2028, the CHP plans to run a more charismatic candidate. In fact, both İmamoğlu and Yavaş perform better than Erdoğan in various opinion polls. As a result, the CHP is highly sensitive to any judicial or bureaucratic barriers that could hinder İmamoğlu or Yavaş’s nomination. This belief in their ‘ultimate weapons,’ the candidacies of these charismatic mayors, has slowed the CHP’s opposition to avoid provoking Erdoğan’s wrath. However, even if İmamoğlu or Yavaş manages to secure the presidential nomination in 2028, it remains a long shot for the CHP to challenge Erdoğan's steadily growing authoritarianism.
Given Erdoğan’s extensive political tools and vast resources, it is extremely challenging for the CHP to keep its broad coalition intact and turn it into an electoral victory. Erdoğan has the ability to sway many members of the CHP coalition to his side. As a master of alliances, he has successfully courted even the most unlikely allies, including former sworn enemies. In the 2023 elections, he brought an ultra-nationalist figure from the opposition into his coalition. Similarly, he is now reaching out to the Kurds and the PKK in preparation for the next elections. Erdoğan possesses both the power to intimidate and the resources to reward, further strengthening his position.
In contrast, the CHP is often seen as an unassertive, genteel figure rather than a fierce fighter. For instance, the party did not put up a strong resistance to the numerous election irregularities that occurred repeatedly over the last decade. The CHP also failed to react meaningfully to the dismissal and arrest of its mayors since October 2024. If the CHP cannot even defend its own allies from Erdoğan, how can it oppose him effectively? Challenging Erdoğan is a costly endeavor, and the CHP offers little to offset that cost. For many groups and individuals, accepting Erdoğan's small rewards seems more appealing than aligning with a fragmented and hesitant opposition. In other words, the idea of forming a broad anti-AKP coalition under the leadership of CHP's charismatic candidate overlooks Erdoğan’s immense power and resources. What Erdoğan can offer is both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to the CHP's uncertain promise of a better future.
Social discontent grows with each passing day. However, in the face of Erdoğan’s power and the opposition’s weakness, this discontent has not yet become an effective force. To transform into such a force, the CHP must prioritize opposition, resistance, and the willingness to challenge Erdoğan’s wrath—accepting the risks and potential consequences—rather than focusing solely on elections.
What Should CHP do?
There is no easy path forward for the CHP. First, the opposition has made many mistakes and, as a result, must now pay a high price for them. The multi-party era in Turkish politics, which began after World War II, has long since ended. When Erdoğan launched his campaign against the Gülen Movement in December 2013, the Turkish opposition remained on the sidelines, viewing the conflict as an internal struggle within the Islamist camp. However, during this period, Erdoğan crossed many lines by undermining the rule of law, the separation of powers, and human rights. By the time Erdoğan had decimated one of Turkey's strongest religious movements, he had nearly absolute control over the regime. In this regard, the CHP's passive stance during these events has certainly come at a cost. Therefore, CHP leaders must now be willing to confront these costs—whether in the form of imprisonment, party closures, financial pressures, or other repercussions.
Second, if CHP leaders expect the support of various dissatisfied sectors of society, they must offer a struggle worthy of that support. Even if this struggle has little chance against Erdoğan’s consolidated regime, it would provide a dignified option for those who have been humiliated for years. At this point, only an emotionally charged, epic struggle can unite broad social discontent and pose a serious challenge to Erdoğan. This struggle could transform CHP into a formidable political force. It would also increase the chances of the CHP candidate—whoever they may be—in the elections, provided Erdoğan still respects the ballot box. While the prospects may be slim, it would leave a legacy of resistance and democratic struggle for the future.
However, if the CHP cannot even stand up and endure direct attacks against itself, resorting instead to ridiculous protests, it should not expect people to invest in the opposition. After recent investigations, İmamoğlu declared that he had 'crossed the Rubicon.' Yet, Caesar already reigns in Rome. The coming weeks will reveal whether İmamoğlu will truly march against Caesar or seek a defensible position, waiting for a Brutus to play his part. The future of the opposition—and Turkey’s democracy—depends not on the ballot box, opinion polls, the economy, or natural disasters, but on their willingness to confront Erdoğan.
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