The Era of Normalization: Turkey-Gulf Relations After al-Ula Summit

Turkey and the Gulf countries have initiated a normalization process since the al-Ula Summit in late 2020. The leaders have mended fences through high-level visits, diplomatic overtures, promises of investments, and dozens of agreements. Turkey has already started to reap the benefits of normalization in terms of economic and diplomatic relations. It is difficult to forecast how long this period of authoritarian peace will last, but it is promising to witness the success of diplomacy in the region.

Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt still have a long way to go, but at least they have succeeded in ending, or at least freezing, the Middle Eastern Cold War. The late 2010s witnessed a fierce geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Qatar on the one side and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt on the other. But, political and economic exhaustion, the confusion about US commitment to the region, the pandemic conditions, and increasing global uncertainties have encouraged both sides to give a chance to diplomacy.

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Source: Ministry of Industry and Commerce

Turkey’s economic troubles have been one of the driving forces of the normalization efforts. After al-Ula Summit, Turkey received a 469 million USD investment from the Emirates. Although it is far below UAE’s 10 billion USD investment promise, the amount is expected to rise if both sides succeed in maintaining friendly relations. 

In terms of bilateral trade volume, there is a clear upward trend with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain. Particularly, the Turkish-Saudi export-import numbers have almost doubled since the al-Ula meeting. In the meantime, it should also be noted that the Turkish-Emirati trade does not seem to be influenced much by political crises.

Source: Ministry of Culture and Tourism

One of the reliable indicators of normalization is the number of Arab tourists to Turkey. Although Turkey has been a popular destination for Gulf tourists, Saudi Arabia and the UAE discouraged their citizens from visiting Turkey during the heydays of the crisis with Turkey. Indeed, after the 2017 Qatar crisis and the 2018 crisis of the Khashoggi killing, there is a down sided trend from those countries. In 2020, COVID-19 stopped tourism, but the numbers started to rise again in the following years. This trend is particularly evident in the significant increase of Emirati visitors, which nearly tripled the average of the 2010s in 2022.

Turkey has also succeeded in ending its diplomatic isolation in the region. Compared to the last decade, the number of high-level diplomatic visits between Turkey and the UAE has increased significantly. The UAE's increasing influence on regional issues has contributed to these numbers. On the other hand, despite ideological and political conflicts, the diplomatic relations with Riyadh remained intact due to cooperation on the Syrian crisis. However, the relations ultimately faltered and could not withstand the Khashoggi crisis. But, after 2020, there is an improvement in diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia too. On the other hand, Turkey maintains stronger ties with Qatar compared to Saudi Arabia or the UAE.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The numbers are optimistic and indicate that Turkey economically and politically benefits from normalization. Moreover, Ankara expects to sell its drones and other defense products, adding another layer to its relations with the Gulf. Yet, there are still reasons for not being over-optimistic.

First, although those countries pursue a more diplomatic approach now, their policies and ambitions have not changed much. There is no indication that they have abandoned their regional interventionist policies. The UAE, for instance, is still an active force in Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. 

In addition, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE still heavily invest in their military capacities. As they have carried out several military interventions so far, it is safe to assume that the military will continue to be a major instrument in future regional issues. Besides, this militarization can go nuclear if any of those countries initiate a program for nuclear armament.

Secondly, the authoritarian peace, which surprised everyone in 2020, can also vanish as quickly. As a nature of Middle Eastern politics, the bilateral relations between those countries depend heavily on personal relations between leaders. Admittedly, increasing trade volume, direct investments, diplomatic contacts, and institutional relations certainly play a stabilizing role in bilateral relations. Indeed, the strengthening of relations, seen in numbers, is promising. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that trade, investments, tourism, and other factors did not offer significant protection for bilateral relations. The leaders can easily initiate another wave of tension and rivalry.

However, there are two promising dynamics. First, ideological differences have lost their central importance in relations. Political Islamism lost its popularity and transformative potential in the 2010s. Also, Ankara put a distance from the Muslim Brotherhood. Besides, Erdogan’s authoritarian turn in domestic politics has decreased the importance of regional democratization for Turkish foreign policy. In this respect, as the ideology has lost its divisive role, future tensions do not have to occur between Turkey-Qatar versus Saudi Arabia-UAE-Egypt fault lines. Instead, alliances and conflicts are likely to be more fluid, permeable, and fast-paced.

The success of regional diplomacy is another promising development. Despite their conflicting interests, they have learned to engage in diplomatic efforts. They have gained a better understanding of their mutual ambitions and capabilities. Thus, even in the face of new tensions, the actors can navigate their relationships without necessarily being drawn into a collision course.