A recent Financial Times analysis, penned by Gideon Rachman, highlights the danger of Syria becoming a battleground between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, two ambitious leaders in the Middle East. However, the challenges in Turkish-Israeli relations in the post-Assad Middle East extend far beyond what Rachman describes as conflicting ambitions. The fall of the Assad regime marks a critical juncture in regional geopolitics, fundamentally altering the dynamics between Turkey and Israel. Historically, their relationship has oscillated between pragmatic alliances and ideological rifts. Yet, with their common enemy removed, the regional balance of power has shifted, creating new challenges and testing the resilience of their already fragile ties.
Turkey became the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949. At the time, while Israel faced isolation from its Arab neighbors, Turkey positioned itself as a valuable ally in a challenging region. Throughout the Cold War, Ankara carefully balanced its relationships with Arab states and Israel. When aligned tightly with the United States, Turkey maintained friendly ties with Israel, reflecting its broader pro-Western policies in the Middle East. However, efforts to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and Arab nations often strained its ties with Tel Aviv. Even in such cases, Turkey maintained a measured and diplomatic approach toward Israel.
The post-Cold War period brought Turkey and Israel closer together, driven by their shared opposition to Syria. Damascus actively supported various leftist and Kurdish groups, particularly the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which posed a significant threat to Turkish sovereignty. In the 1990s, the two nations elevated their diplomatic ties to ambassadorial levels, leading to booming trade, tourism, and bilateral visits. Security cooperation flourished, with Turkey becoming a major buyer of Israeli defense products. Under Turkey’s ultra-secular military-security establishment, collaboration with Israel became a cornerstone of its Middle East policy.
During the AKP era, however, Turkish-Israeli relations grew increasingly complex. The dynamic was characterized by neither boundless animosity nor consistent pragmatism. Diplomatic relations were repeatedly interrupted by Israeli military operations in Gaza, with the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident—where Israeli forces killed Turkish activists in international waters—marking the lowest point. Turkey’s open support for Hamas further strained ties. Despite these tensions, bilateral trade continued to thrive throughout the AKP years. Even during Israel’s military operations in Gaza following the October 7 attack in 2023, Erdoğan maintained trade relations, including materials used to sustain Israel’s war efforts.
This enduring economic relationship was partly sustained by the absence of a direct geopolitical conflict and the presence of a shared adversary. The so-called “Shia Crescent,” stretching from Tehran to Lebanon, posed a mutual threat to Ankara and Jerusalem. Their shared perception of growing Iranian influence created fertile ground for tacit cooperation, even as ideological differences, exacerbated by Erdoğan’s and Netanyahu’s populism, strained diplomatic ties. Israel’s operations targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions were often met with Turkish neutrality. In mid-2024, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed hopes that Israeli efforts to weaken Iran and Hezbollah would create a power vacuum in Syria, indirectly benefiting Turkey’s regional ambitions.
The removal of Assad, however, fundamentally changes the dynamics of this relationship for three key reasons. First, the shared threat perception of Iran has significantly diminished. While Netanyahu may still pursue an aggressive stance against Tehran, especially with the possible backing of a returning Trump administration, Iranian proxies no longer pose an immediate threat to Israel. Similarly, while Turkish-Iranian competition will continue in Iraq and the Caucasus, the absence of Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah makes other fronts more manageable for Ankara.
Second, Erdoğan’s threats against Israel, often dismissed as rhetorical in the past, may carry more weight given Turkey’s newfound leverage. Turkey’s expanded influence now brings it to the borders of Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel, making the two nations de facto neighbors. Previously, despite harsh rhetoric, the risk of military escalation between Ankara and Tel Aviv was minimal. Now, as Turkish intelligence, military, and civil operations will be active in areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Turkey’s presence near Israel’s borders may introduce new flashpoints for conflict.
Third, Turkey and Israel now hold conflicting visions for Syria’s future. Israeli leaders appear to favor a fragmented Syria with buffer zones to provide security against HTS and other actors. In contrast, Turkey opposes any fragmentation of Syria, fearing it could lead to the establishment of a Kurdish state under PKK influence. Also, even if such fragmentation does not lead to a Kurdish state, it will cripple Turkey’s victory in Syria. Thus, Ankara seeks to consolidate HTS’s control over a unified Syria, ensuring its own strategic interests are safeguarded. If HTS attempts to challenge Israeli-held territories or if Israel acts to weaken HTS, tensions could escalate. Unlike Israel’s war with Hamas and Hezbollah, Turkey is likely to be more involved in a conflict between Israel and HTS.
Meanwhile, Israel no longer depends on Turkey as it once did. The normalization of Israeli relations with Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and potentially Saudi Arabia, has broadened its regional alliances. These Arab nations, wary of an Islamist victory in Syria and Turkey’s growing regional influence, might remain neutral or even side with Israel in any renewed tension with Ankara and Damascus.
Until now, Turkish-Israeli tensions have primarily been ideological and rhetorical. However, Assad’s fall fundamentally changes the nature of their relationship. This shift introduces a geopolitical rivalry that, when combined with their enduring ideological differences, could lead to more dangerous escalations in the post-Assad Middle East.
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