Turkey’s oil demand is projected to rise significantly in the coming decades. According to a recent report, Electrifying Turkey’s Roads: EV Adoption Scenarios and Their Impact on Oil Imports, if the Turkish government’s vehicle fleet projections hold true, Turkey’s oil demand could more than double by 2050. In each scenario, Turkey’s crude oil imports continue to rise in absolute terms. This energy demand has repercussions for Turkey’s economy as much as for its foreign policy.
In fact, Turkey’s energy import dependency is likely to grow rather than shrink. In this regard, a problem is that Turkey remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers in terms of natural gas and oil. Turkey’s domestic production of natural gas met only four percent of consumption in 2024. The rest came from abroad—42 percent from Russia, 22 percent from Azerbaijan, and 14 percent from Iran. Offshore fields in the Black Sea have raised Ankara’s hopes, but even optimistic estimates suggest they will only cover about 30 percent of national demand within the next decade.
In 2024, Turkey’s domestic crude oil production averaged approximately 127,000 barrels per day, a volume insufficient to meet national demand. As a result, the country imported close to 1 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products. These imports were concentrated among a limited number of suppliers, with Russia accounting for 56.4 percent, Iraq 16 percent, and Kazakhstan 10 percent.
Without major changes, the country risks anchoring its future to a small set of external suppliers. Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan already account for the overwhelming share of its hydrocarbons. Alternative suppliers face their own constraints. Iraq lacks export infrastructure and suffers from political instability. Turkmenistan remains blocked by unresolved Caspian legal disputes. Egypt has become a net importer again. Relations with Israel are too fragile to support multi-billion-dollar energy projects.
Electric vehicles offer no easy way out. While the shift to electric vehicles will reduce Turkey’s crude oil demand growth, it does not automatically strengthen energy security, as its electricity needs may grow exponentially. Turkey may be forced to build additional gas and coal-fired power plants to meet the demand in short-term, repeating earlier patterns in which surging electricity demand translated into greater dependence on imported hydrocarbons, especially from Russia. This risk is especially high if Turkey’s renewables expand too slowly.
Nuclear power is sometimes presented as a fix, but here too the picture is complicated. Turkey’s only active nuclear project, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plan, is financed, built, and will be operated by Russia’s Rosatom. Once fully operational, Akkuyu is expected to meet about ten percent of national electricity demand. Plans exist for three additional nuclear power plants in Sinop and Thrace, with potential partners from Japan, South Korea, and China. None of these agreements, however, has been finalized. If nuclear expansion proceeds without diversification of partners, Ankara may end up exchanging oil dependence for nuclear dependence.
This structural vulnerability may leave Turkey with little room to maneuver. To secure uninterrupted flows of gas and nuclear fuel, Ankara would maintain close ties with energy-rich neighbors, most of which are authoritarian states. Dependency, in other words, is not only an economic problem but also a political one.
The policy response has to be threefold. First, expand generation capacity with a particular emphasis on renewables. Wind and solar together accounted for less than 20 percent of electricity generation in 2024. Integrating more of them into the grid will require investment in transmission, storage, and grid management.
Second, make modest improvements in efficiency—such as advanced conductors, grid sensors, and distributed energy management—have been shown to unlock the equivalent of new power plants.
Third, diversify partnerships. Depending on a single provider, whether for natural gas pipelines or nuclear reactors, creates long-term risk. Turkey needs a broader set of suppliers and investment partners if it is to maintain strategic autonomy. This means that Turkey should work with countries other than Russia for the future nuclear plants to ensure that electricity capacity does not rely on a single country prone to sanctions.
Turkey’s energy challenge is not about whether demand will rise—it will. The question is whether the country can meet this demand without reinforcing its external dependence. Electrification of the vehicles offers opportunities, but if mismanaged it may continue reliance on hydrocarbons in a different shape and on a narrow set of foreign partners. A deliberate strategy of diversification, investment in renewables, and modernization of the grid is therefore essential. The alternative is an energy system that grows more vulnerable as it grows larger.
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