Recent Israeli airstrikes on military infrastructure in Homs, Hama, and Damascus—coupled with accusations that Ankara is attempting to transform Syria into a Turkish protectorate—underscore the extent to which Israeli officials perceive Turkey’s involvement in Syria as a threat. Ankara argues that the Israeli military strikes are undermining regional stability and counterterrorism efforts against ISIS. But behind this rhetoric lies a much deeper strategic divergence.
Israel envisions a fragmented, decentralized Syria—too weak to challenge Israeli security or project any real influence in the region. Turkey, on the other hand, is betting on a stable, powerful, and unitary Syrian state—though not necessarily a democratic one. These conflicting visions—one oriented toward containment, the other toward consolidation—are on a collision course. Still, the possibility of a limited working arrangement in Syria—despite the mistrust—cannot be ruled out, especially with U.S. mediation.
Israel’s Worst-Case Planning
HTS’s origins go back to al-Qaeda. While the President of Syria, Al-Sharaa, claims the group has broken with its past, no one can confidently assume that, once firmly in control, HTS would not pursue a sectarian agenda or provoke skirmishes with Israel along the border. Given this ideological pedigree, Israel is likely to keep harboring deep suspicion toward the future Syrian government.
The Israelis are preparing for the worst-case scenario: a confrontation with Syria supported by Turkish drones and air defense systems. This is why Israel has preemptively struck key airbases like T4 and Palmyra, where Turkish teams were reportedly preparing to establish a more permanent presence. For Israeli planners, a divided and toothless Syrian state—something resembling a Syrian version of the Palestinian Authority—is far less threatening than a unified regime backed by Turkish weapons.
Consequently, this vision of the future requires the continued presence of U.S. troops in Syria and the prevention of Turkish military bases that could restrict Israel’s freedom of action. Israel possesses both the means and the determination to continue this policy by dismantling the remnants of Syria’s military capabilities. Nonetheless, the Turkish government envisions an entirely different future for Syria.
Turkey’s Endgame in Syria
From the outset of the civil war, Turkey invested heavily in supporting the Syrian armed opposition. The goal was to see Assad gone—and jihadist groups became one of the most consequential tools in that campaign. Now, with the armed opposition in power, Ankara is doubling down on Al-Sharaa, providing him with everything needed to build a new regime. There is no denying the ideological baggage of HTS, but for Turkey’s ruling AKP, that does not seem to be a problem.
Moreover, if this regime collapses, Syria could slide back into chaos, opening the door to a new civil war. And that is a scenario Ankara wants to avoid at all costs—not just because of security concerns, but because it would undermine over a decade of Turkish political investment.
That said, Ankara’s policy toward HTS’s consolidation is not just driven by security or ideological alignment. It is more about the prestige of the AKP’s Syrian policy, which has faced harsh domestic criticism. Other issues—like the Kurdish YPG or border instability—are important, but they come second.
The recent outbreak of sectarian violence in Latakia shows that the Syrian state still struggles to consolidate control. For Ankara, Turkish military bases inside Syria could provide emergency support to Damascus and help prevent potential insurgencies.
Despite all the friction, neither Turkey nor Israel wants a direct military confrontation, as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has explicitly stated. And that is one reason why Turkish-Syrian military cooperation has not been finalized: Ankara is being careful not to trigger a backlash from either the U.S. or Israel.
What Cooperation Could Look Like
Trump, at Netanyahu’s request, offered to mediate between Turkey and Israel. Based on his statement, one could even infer that he favored Erdoğan over Netanyahu, urging him to come forward with reasonable demands for a settlement. That’s telling.
A working arrangement on Syria could benefit everyone involved—the Syrians, the Turks, and the Israelis. The new Syrian government does not just need stability and security; it also needs economic development. Israel, by helping to lift the sanctions imposed during the civil war, could play a key role in that effort—especially in dealing with U.S. and European resistance. Besides, maintaining a buffer zone inside Syria will be expensive and risky for Israel, as the tragic events after last October’s attacks demonstrate.
Yet it remains unclear how Turkey and Syria can offer Israel the kind of hard security guarantees it would demand. Symbolic gestures won’t cut it. Israel would expect verifiable commitments, military oversight mechanisms, and restrictions on the deployment of Turkish troops. It may also request clearly defined spheres of influence between Turkey and Israel—something that would be difficult for Damascus to accept.
American mediation is helpful to prevent further escalation between Turkey and Israel over Syria. Trump’s remarks, notably sympathetic toward Turkey, suggest a willingness to persuade Israel to accept Ankara’s expanded role in Syria. But that will only be possible if Turkey and Syria can deliver on stability, and offer something more than vague assurances.
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