“The center of gravity is the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed,” according to famous German strategist Carl von Clausewitz. If Clausewitz were a political scientist today, he would probably say the Turkish security bureaucracy, not the Parliament or Erdogan’s palace, is still the center of gravity of the Turkish state. Islamists, Turkish nationalists, Kemalists, Alawites, and religious groups…They all contend for more influence in the military, police force, gendarmerie, and probably intelligence. The internal balance of power in the security bureaucracy directly influences Turkish politics. A perception of change in that balance can immediately escalate the tensions or affect alignments. So indeed, the graduation ceremony of new cadets from the war college on August 30 has once more polarized the politics in Turkey.
The cadets’ graduation ceremony ended as expected. Erdogan made a speech. He gave awards to the top graduates of the military schools (The top graduates of all the military, naval, and air force academies are females). He also inaugurated a mosque within the academy premises (There are 7 more mosque constructions in other military schools.). Yet, according to videos on social media, new cadets gathered after the end of the ceremony and took a traditional cadet oath which was canceled after the July 2016 coup attempt. They drew their swords and promised to protect the secular and democratic republic. This oath was part of the official ceremony until 2016. Following the oath, the cadets chanted slogans saying they were soldiers of Mustafa Kemal, the country's founding father.
This incident has triggered the traditional secular-Islamist fault line in Turkish politics. For pro-Erdogan Islamists, those graduates are a new generation of Kemalists who have not given up their putschist ambitions. Politicians from Islamist parties and social media accounts asked for swift action from the government against the remnants of Kemalism within the military. For seculars and nationalists, on the other hand, nothing is more natural than a cadet’s oath to protect secular democracy or slogans for Mustafa Kemal. These young soldiers wanted to show their gratitude for the eternal leader.
The young cadets’ oath was not an uprising or coup, but it was neither a routine nor an ordinary act as the secular opposition argues. It was routine until 2016. Yet, today it looks like a kind of resistance and reaction to Erdogan and his party. Turkey’s religious conservatives used such occasions as a way of resistance themselves in the past. Official food prayers in schools and military barracks, for instance, were addressed to ‘Tanrı’ (God), not Allah, which sounds like a more secular deity in Turkish. Yet, some religious teachers, students, or soldiers preferred Allah, which was a rejection against the imposition of official Islam. Likewise, young cadets bring up the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a form of resistance.
However, the young cadets’ debut still raises some questions, as military scholar Hakan Şahin noted. First, how could such resistance be possible after years of AKP’s purges of the military schools? The schools have been under close supervision of Islamists since 2016. More importantly, military schools accept students after a political vetting process. Second, how can a group of new graduates perform such an act of resistance? Let alone widespread purges against Gulenists after 2016, the schools fired a group of students due to a quarrel over Atatürk last year. When government scrutiny is so close over the schools, what did young cadets do necessitate an act of courage in new Turkey? Last but not least, how much does the cadets’ demonstration reflect the general sentiment in the Turkish military? Şahin thinks there is not enough fact to give answers for those questions. Turkish politics continues to surprise its followers.
On the other hand, this incident also shows the extent of factionalization within the security bureaucracy. After the 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan purged tens of thousands of soldiers and police officers on the grounds of Gulenist affiliation. These purges fueled a cutthroat rivalry among different groups vying to fill the vacant positions in the bureaucracy. This factionalization undermines the professionalism within the bureaucracy and engenders Turkey’s internal and external security.
In the graduation video, there are nearly 300 or 400 cadets, Şahin approximates. Given that the total number of graduates is 960, almost the same number of cadets, maybe more, rejected to join the after-party – an indication of factionalization, according to Şahin. So indeed, the abovementioned quarrel between students indicates this factionalization too. The quarrel started when some of the young cadets did not want to pin Ataturk pictures on their uniforms during the commemoration ceremonies for his death.
The factionalization is not limited to the military. The police force is witnessing a power play between the nationalists and religious groups. Süleyman Soylu, former Interior Minister, favored nationalists within the police force. Erdogan replaced him after the 2023 elections with Ali Yerlikaya, who is allegedly closer to Menzil group. Yerlikaya promotes Menzil to balance against the nationalists – which raises tensions within the force. Yet, despite Yerlikaya’s efforts, nationalists still hold a significant amount of power within the police force. A few weeks ago, the director of the Police Special Forces Team made a gesture of loyalty to the Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli’s with a Godfather-style hand kiss.
Menzil group is not the only group that is active within the bureaucracy, but it is among the leading ones alongside İskenderpaşa/Hakyol group, Erenköy group, and some Nurcu groups. According to rumors, the group holds significant power within the intelligence apparatus and gendarmerie. Menzil’s member in charge of gendarmerie held a meeting with the Deputy General Commander of the force. The meeting was reportedly about the appointments within the gendarmerie.
Then, what does Erdogan think about this factionalization? According to Ömer Murat, former Turkish diplomat and political analyst, such tensions work for Erdogan whose popularity has plummeted because of the economic crisis and AKP’s social disconnectedness. Reminding Kemalist boogeyman to his conservative base may help him to divert attention from such social and economic troubles.
Also, Erdoğan’s tactics fuels factionalism within the bureaucracy, whether involving religious or secular groups, as part of a longstanding divide-and-conquer strategy. Using an authoritarian playbook, Erdogan controls the security bureaucracy by playing rival factions to each other. In line with that, it would not be surprising if Erdogan allocated some quota for nationalists or Kemalists to balance against religious groups. He also does not skip delicately trimming overgrown branches from every group. In this year’s appointments for the military, he kept Kemalist names at the forefront while surreptitiously discarding some other Kemalists.
Having said that, Erdogan’s upper hand does not mean his full indisputable control over the state. Even under authoritarian regimes, the relationship between the leader and the bureaucracy or elites is not a simple command and control system. In her book, titled Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP, Ceren Lord explains how Turkish Diyanet bargained its position, power, and autonomy even during the heydays of secular Kemalism. Likewise, today, different political factions seem to have the capacity to bargain with Erdogan. Indeed, between Erdogan and his partner Bahçeli, there has been a hard bargaining going on for some time. Also, secular Kemalists have some bargaining capacity with Erdogan. For sure, they do have neither intention nor capacity to challenge Erdogan’s power. Rather, this is a bargaining to cohabitate with Erdogan, and if succeeds, outlive Erdogan.
Young cadets’ oath and slogans might be spontaneous acts of courage. Yet, this incident has revealed once more the extent of factionalization within Turkey’s security bureaucracy. It may be good for Erdogan. As argued by Hakki Tas, populist leaders prioritize the bureaucracy’s loyalty to their own personalities by using ‘individual, communal, or ideological ties.’ Nevertheless, this causes politicization of army and institutional ‘decay’.
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