This report focuses on Turkey's prominence as an emerging market for cocaine trafficking and organized crime in the last decade. Cocaine production in Latin America has dramatically increased since 2013, and Turkey’s status as an emerging market has attracted the attention of Latin American government officials on the front lines of the cocaine trade.1
The escalating demand and price for cocaine in European markets have created a lucrative incentive for drug traffickers. Simultaneously, Turkey's increase in organized crime groups, the country’s strategic geographic location and evolving political landscape provide ideal conditions for smuggling operations and have made the country increasingly attractive to Latin American cartels.
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors driving Turkey's transformation into an emerging cocaine trafficking hub. Open-source data is compiled and analyzed to illustrate the scale and scope of cocaine seizures within Turkey and originating from Latin America en route to Turkish shores.
The evidence presented suggests that the actors in Turkey actively facilitates the flow of cocaine to Europe, rather than providing a passive transit point. The noted rise in cocaine seizures is not necessarily indicative of more effective law enforcement; rather, it highlights the sheer volume of cocaine transit through Turkey. The simultaneous rise in drug treatment requests for cocaine use in Turkey over the past decade suggests that the country itself has become an emerging market for cocaine.
The findings suggest that cocaine trafficking through Turkey has become a multibillion-dollar business that encompasses several countries and international organized crime groups. The scale of this illicit trade underscores the immense profits at stake and highlights the urgent need for effective measures to counteract the threat.
The first section of the report examines Latin America and global trends in cocaine trafficking. The second section addresses the rise of cocaine trafficking in Europe. The final section explores Turkey's recent emergence as a key player in the cocaine trade and its underlying causes.
Latin America has long been a major global source of coca bush cultivation and cocaine production and trafficking. The region’s pivotal role has been reinforced through its significant strengthening of production capacity in recent years, coupled with a lack of state capacity to curb this trend. Latin America is now a producer and exporter of cocaine on an unprecedented scale. The surge in cocaine production in the region is a multifaceted issue driven by economic incentives, political instability, corruption, and global demand.
On the other hand, the number of people who use cocaine is increasing at a faster rate than population growth.2 Both demand and supply of cocaine are geographically concentrated in the Americas, Western Europe, and Oceania, established markets in which cocaine use levels far surpass those of other regions.
In 2023, Colombia and Bolivia reported a record-breaking number of cocaine seizures, and Peru reported a significant increase in coca base confiscations.3 One of the primary drivers of this increase is the high profitability of cocaine production. In rural areas with limited economic opportunities, coca cultivation offers farmers and producers a lucrative alternative to growing traditional crops. Coca farmers in Colombia earn approximately $1,200 annually per hectare of coca, compared to just $300 annually per hectare of coffee.4
This income disparity drives impoverished farmers toward coca cultivation, contributing to the persistent expansion of the industry. Colombia remains the principal source of cocaine cultivation. In 2022, Colombia recorded its highest-ever coca crop coverage of 204,000 hectares,5 followed by Peru with 80,700 hectares, a trend attributed to the substantial profitability of cocaine production.6
The recent increase in cocaine production in Latin America is closely tied to political instability and corruption in the region. Weak governance, an increasingly uncertain security environment, and limited state presence in rural areas enable illegal activities like cocaine production, while corruption among officials and law enforcement officers gives traffickers impunity. All of these factors foster an environment that is conducive to organized crime.7
For example, Ecuador has seen a significant rise in criminal violence in recent years. The country's homicide rate has increased by 500% between 2016 and 2023, and cocaine seizures have also significantly increased in the same period.8 In early 2024, Ecuadorian authorities seized 22 tons of cocaine in a single operation, highlighting Ecuador's emergence as a key launching point for international cocaine trafficking.9 Guayaquil, the largest city in Ecuador, has become an epicenter for cocaine trafficking, marked by conflict between criminal organizations and the state.
Increased control along Colombia's borders has pushed cocaine traffickers to find alternative routes in the region. Consequently, cocaine trafficking from Colombia has significantly increased in Venezuela, which has become an attractive alternative route due to its weak state capacity for law enforcement. Venezuelan officials reported seizing 44 tons of cocaine in 2022, indicating the expanding role of new coca-growing regions.10
According to the UNODC 2024 World Drug Report, cocaine consumption and production have reached record levels.11 Increasing international demand for cocaine has significantly driven its production in Latin America. Interceptions of cocaine shipments by law enforcement have significantly increased worldwide, with seizures reaching a record high of nearly 2,000 tons in 2023.12
North America remains the world’s biggest cocaine market; however, cocaine consumption in the region has been declining since 2017. In 2020, it accounted for approximately 30% of the world’s past-year cocaine users, with an estimated 1.95% of people aged 15–64 having used cocaine at least once, according to UNODC.13
The United States has waged a relentless “war on drugs” in Latin America since the 1980s, aiming to curb the production and trafficking of narcotics. While these efforts have yielded some results, the US market has also become oversaturated, and American consumers increasingly prefer synthetic drugs like fentanyl. Consequently, drug trafficking organizations have strategically shifted their cocaine smuggling operations to new regions.
North America has long been a major global consumer of cocaine. The US market peaked in 2017 and has slightly contracted since then. Interdictions and purity levels in wholesale markets suggest a slight decline in incoming flows and availability. However, demand-side indicators suggest that the market has decreased since 2018. Simultaneously, Western and Central Europe has started to emerge as the second-largest global consumer market for cocaine after the United States and a favored destination for South American drug cartels seeking new markets to absorb their increased cocaine production.14
The cocaine market in South Eastern Europe has expanded and become increasingly harmful such as drug use disorders and direct drug-related deaths in recent years.15 This expansion was facilitated by supply channels that developed around 2012, marked by the increased integration of Western Europe into global cocaine markets. Cocaine consumption in Europe has increased over the last decade, and the current profit margins are higher than those in the United States. The European Union (EU) countries’ cocaine market was valued at €11.6 billion ($12.6 billion) in 2021, according to the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).16 One kilogram of cocaine is valued at $28,000 wholesale in the United States; however, the same kilogram in Europe is valued at around $40,000.17
Cocaine is the second most common illicit drug in Europe, and its consumption has increased since 2016. The upward trend in cocaine exports is further supported by wastewater data analysis in Europe, which detects drug residues. According to the 2023 European Drug Report, cocaine consumption increased in 2021 and 2022 in 37 of 65 cities included in the report. EU Drugs Agency indicates that approximately 2.5 million individuals aged 15–34 (2.5% of this age group in Europe) used cocaine in 2023.18 In the Flemish region of Belgium—which is home to Antwerp, the cocaine capital of Europe— cocaine usage among individuals aged 15–64 increased from 0.8% in 2008 to 1.7% in 2018.19 An estimated 2.4% of adults in the Netherlands used cocaine in 2022, an increase from 1.6% in 2015.20
Cocaine enters Europe through airborne, maritime, and land routes. Land routes traverse Turkey and the Balkan countries, and airborne transport often involves concealment of small drug quantities by commercial airway passengers. The predominant and most significant route is maritime. Ecuador has emerged as the primary source for cocaine destined for Europe from Latin America. The bustling ports in western Europe serve as hubs for cocaine distribution, predominantly orchestrated by Albanian organized crime groups that wield significant influence over the European drug trade.
The Antwerp Port seized 40 tons of cocaine in 2017, 60 tons in 2019, 91 tons in 2021, and 110 tons in 2022.21 In 2023, Belgian port authorities set a record by seizing 121 tons of cocaine. Authorities estimate that these seizures only intercept approximately one-tenth of the cocaine entering through Belgian ports. In comparison, US customs and border officials seized just 37 tons of cocaine in 2023 across the country. In 2022, South American nations intercepted 270 tons of cocaine destined for Europe, with 70 tons of that total earmarked for Antwerp.22
The shift in cocaine trafficking from the United States to Europe has been driven by several factors. Over the past decade, Mexican cartels have gained control over key US border crossing points, relegating Colombian traffickers to the role of suppliers. Faced with the risks of confronting these cartels and becoming primary targets of US anti-narcotics efforts, Colombia traffickers chose instead to focus on the European market, which offers higher profits and lower risks than the US market. As a result, Europe has emerged as arguably the most important cocaine market in the world. Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium are key entry points and currently represent the majority of cocaine seizures. Previously, these countries were primarily supplied by small-volume traffickers using mules or courier mail. However, in recent years, trafficking has shifted to shipping containers, which arrive at ports containing hundreds and even thousands of kilos.
The cocaine trade in Latin America was once controlled by just a few major players, including Colombian and Mexican cartels. However, given new global trends and the fact that Europe has become the primary market for Latin American cocaine, new actors in Europe have started to play crucial roles in cocaine trafficking.
Criminal groups in Europe and the Balkans have been increasing their influence in the region. These criminal organizations have taken advantage of widespread corruption and lack of security in critical infrastructure such as ports, which these groups exploit to bring drugs to the European continent. They use various routes and methods to transport cocaine from Latin America to major ports in Europe.23
European and Balkan drug trafficking organizations have established trafficking routes and direct relationships with Latin American traffickers. These connections allow them to bypass intermediaries, enhancing direct cocaine supply lines. Authorities report that as cocaine production has surged in South America over the past decade, Balkan traffickers have become key players in fueling the European drug demand. They now control the logistics of transporting cocaine from Andean labs to street sellers in major cities like Paris, London, and Berlin, making Europe the world’s leading cocaine market.24 In recent years, criminal emissaries from Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Albania have moved to South America to broker cocaine shipments for their European-based organizations, connecting directly with local producers and traffickers to get the cheapest possible wholesale prices.25
By leveraging their established routes and presence in Latin America, European and Balkan drug trafficking organizations can effectively negotiate with sellers, transporters, and corruption cells to ensure a steady flow of drugs into Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Such connections have enabled Balkan organized crime groups to become one of the main beneficiaries of the Europe’s booming cocaine trade. Reports indicate that certain Balkan criminal groups buy cocaine at about $2,000–4,000 per kilogram in South America and sell it wholesale to drug traffickers across Europe at $30,000–40,000 per kilogram.26
As Europe has increasingly become the primary target market for Latin American cocaine, another eye-catching development has happened, Turkey has simultaneously emerged as an important market for the global cocaine trade. The volume of cocaine seized in Turkey has surged in recent years, from 2.84 tons of cocaine intercepted in 2021 to 2.2 tons in 2022 and 2.85 tons in 2023,27 nearly eight times the amount confiscated annually in the early 2010s.28
It is important to note that the rise in cocaine seizures is not necessarily indicative of more effective law enforcement; rather, it suggests a significant increase in the volume of cocaine being trafficked through the country. Weakening of the rule of law, political alliances, judicial corruption, and compromised law enforcement have all contributed to Turkey's expanding role in illicit drug trade.
This report gathered data from open sources, such as media reports and press releases from different countries, to provide a clearer picture of Turkey's burgeoning role in the cocaine trade. The report findings are drawn from extensive information on cocaine seizures in Latin America and Europe, particularly focusing on cocaine shipments destined for Turkey.
Table 1 - Cocaine Seizures En Route from Latin America Destined for Turkey
Cocaine seizures from Latin America destined for Turkey have dramatically increased between 2017 and 2024. A 2017 seizure of 3,800 kg in Spain marked the beginning of this trend.29 By 2020, the scale of trafficking had escalated significantly, evidenced by a single but substantial seizure of 5,000 kg in Colombia.30
In 2021, the trend persisted with a notable seizure of 1,300 kg in Brazil,31 and in 2022, there were multiple seizures totaling 1,696 kg, with significant interceptions in Ecuador (46 kg in February32 and 850 kg in June)33 and Malta (800 kg in April).34 This geographical distribution suggests that Turkey receives cocaine from a range of Latin American countries.
The upward trend dramatically intensified in 2023, with total seizures reaching 8,024 kg. This total includes significant interceptions in Italy (5,300 kg in July),35 Peru (2,300 kg in March),36 Spain (110 kg in February),37 and Colombia (314 kg in September).38
Incomplete 2024 data suggest that the increase in cocaine seizures continues. As of September 2024, notable amounts include 1,400 kg in Morocco (January),39 151 kg in Colombia (May),40 155 kg in Panama (June),41 and 3,000 kg in Venezuela (September),42 an overall total of 4,706 kg of cocaine seized.
Table 2 presents information on cocaine seizures from 2020 to 2023, including the amounts seized in Turkey and en route, as well as the estimated retail price and estimated value of the trafficked volume. In 2020, a total of 6,961 kg of cocaine was seized, including 5,000 kg abroad and 1,961 kg in Turkey. By 2023, the total seizures had increased to 10,874 kg, with 8,024 kg seized abroad and 2,850 kg in Turkey.
The estimated retail price of cocaine in Turkey has shifted from $57.84 per gram in 2020 to $44.48 per gram in 2021 and $53.35 per gram in 2022, according to the UNODC.43 Official data are not yet available for 2023. Key witness statements indicate that as of July 2024, the retail price of cocaine in Istanbul is approximately $90 (3,000 TL) per gram, with prices potentially increasing by up to 50% depending on purity level.
These retail prices are specific to Turkey; cocaine prices are higher in Europe and substantially higher in the Gulf countries. Approximately 20% of cocaine trafficked to the Middle East is controlled by Turkish criminal organizations.44
The market value of seized cocaine trafficked through Turkey was $403 million in 2020, $184 million in 2021, and $212 million in 2022. If the prices remained stable, the estimated market value for 2023 is $580 million.
Notably, these figures represent only a small fraction of the total cocaine trafficked. Estimates from reports, such as Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and InSight Crime—suggest that only about 10–20% of cocaine is intercepted by law enforcement in Europe.45
If seizures en route to or within Turkey account for 10–20% of total trafficked cocaine through the country, then based on prices cited by UNODC reports, the estimated total value of cocaine that passed through Turkey in 2023 was between $2.9 and $5.8 billion. This estimated figure represents an increase from previous years: $2 to $4 billion in 2020, $0.9 to $1.8 billion in 2021, and $1.1 to $2.1 billion in 2022.
As the data in this report suggests, Turkey has rapidly evolved into a significant transit point for the global cocaine trade. Effective law enforcement and interdiction alone cannot explain the increased number of cocaine seizures in Turkey.
This section of the report will outline the factors contributing to Turkey's increasing role in cocaine trafficking and criminal activities. While cocaine trafficking has increased globally, several factors have made Turkey particularly susceptible to this trend. These factors include widespread purges within the judiciary and police, controversial residency and citizenship policies, and the government’s lenient approach to illicit financial flows.
Turkey's lenient residency and citizenship laws for wealthy foreigners have made the country a haven for criminals.46 Further, Turkey's refusal to extradite its citizens offers a safe haven for those seeking to evade prosecution in their home countries.47 Turkish Law No. 6706 on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, adopted on April 23, 2016, stipulates that a request for extradition shall not be accepted if the person who is requested to be extradited is a Turkish national, except for obligations required by being a party to the International Criminal Court.48
In 2018, Turkey introduced new regulations to provide an easy process to obtain Turkish citizenship through real estate purchases. To stimulate further investment, the threshold for this process was later reduced to $250,000 in real estate investment.49
This policy has inadvertently facilitated the operations of high-profile criminals. For example, Rawa Majid, a Swedish-Kurdish crime boss known as the “Kurdish Fox,” acquired Turkish citizenship in 2018 despite an Interpol red notice for drug trafficking and attempted murder. It is unclear how Majid bypassed Interpol’s system despite his fingerprint information being registered in the criminal database. Turkey denied Sweden’s request to extradite Majid to Sweden due to his Turkish citizenship.50 After a brief imprisonment, he was released in Turkey.51 He is believed to have fled to Iran. There are also reports that Rawa Majid’s network was behind the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Sweden in January 2024. Israeli media, based on information from Mossad, claimed that Majid had been recruited by Iran to carry out this attack.52 Swedish authorities also blamed Iran for the attack but did not specify any organized group.
Similarly, Croatian drug lord Nenad Petrak acquired Turkish citizenship in 2022 by purchasing a $250,000 apartment, despite an Interpol red notice. He also adopted a Turkish-sounding name, “Nenat Çelik.” Petrak was involved in importing cocaine from South America to Europe, reportedly earning more than €27 million monthly in 2020.53 He was arrested on November 18, 2023.54
Another criminal ring that has taken advantage of Turkey’s citizenship scheme is the Kotor gang, established in Montenegro by Darko Saric, known as the “Escobar of the Balkans”. In 2018, Jovan Vukotic, the leader of a faction within the gang, was arrested in Turkey based on a red notice by Interpol. Later, he was extradited to Serbia, where the High Court in Belgrade sentenced him to 15 months in prison for using a forged North Macedonian passport.55 Vukotic re-entered Turkey in 2021 with a fake passport and lived as a legal resident in Istanbul until his assassination in 2022.56 Ironically, the leaders of a rival faction of the Kotor gang, Radoje Zivkovic and Milan Vujotic, hired a Turkish gang leader in Izmir to assassinate Vukotic.57 Ten days after Vukotic’s assassination, they were arrested on suspicion of being behind the murder. One of these men, Milan Vujotic, had also obtained a Turkish residence permit using a fake ID.
The AKP government's frequent tax amnesty programs aim to repatriate undeclared funds and boost the nation's foreign reserves. Motivated by Turkey's economic challenges, the initiatives have provided an opportunity for criminals to launder illicit proceeds under the guise of legitimate wealth. These programs have attracted significant interest from individuals involved in Latin American drug trafficking.
A key aspect of Turkey’s tax amnesty program incentives is the lack of scrutiny regarding the source of the declared assets, whether from illicit activities or legitimate sources. Individuals or entities pay a nominal tax on the declared amount. For example, the initiative offered from August 2022 to March 2023 offered a tax rate of 1% for those who notified before September 2022 and 3% for those who notified by March 2023.58 Once the tax was paid, the assets were deemed fully legitimate and could be transferred or used without legal consequences. This simplicity made the program an appealing option for criminal money laundering.
A notable case is that of Hakan Ayık, Australia's most wanted man, who was arrested in Turkey in November 2023 on drug trafficking charges. This arrest made headlines in Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand. Ayık, the alleged leader of the Comanchero gang, was apprehended with 36 gang members. Turkish authorities seized $250 million in assets, including real estate, bank accounts, and luxury cars.59 Interestingly, Ayık’s high school classmate, Duax Ngakuru, the “world president” of the Comanchero gang, was arrested in Istanbul in January 2023. A photo of Ngakuru and Ayık together was published after Ngakuru's arrest, raising questions about the delay in capturing Ayık.60
Before his arrest, Ayık was frequently mentioned in Turkish media. In March 2022, reports claimed he was living luxuriously in Turkey, despite being a wanted drug lord.61 A 2020 article revealed that Ayık had been convicted in absentia by an Australian court, which had also imposed a $4 million fine. This article noted that he was wanted by Interpol.62 Despite his status as a fugitive and Australia's most wanted man with an international red notice against him, Ayık was able to transfer his illicit revenue from Australia to Turkey without any hindrances due to the tax amnesty program.
Turkish authorities were clearly aware of Ayık's presence in the country. A June 2021 article in the Sydney Morning Herald describes how the paper “tracked down Australia’s most wanted man to his glamorous new life” in Istanbul.63 The article names his hotel and several of his friends, and it includes several photos and short video footage of him. Even discounting the likely possibility of official assistance or tacit approval from Turkish authorities, the case of Hakan Ayık clearly demonstrates that Turkey’s policies offer opportunity for drug lords to hide for an extended period and manage their operations without significant obstacles.
One of the most important reasons for the increase in cocaine seizures in Turkey is the undermining of the rule of law in the country since 2013. After the alleged failed coup attempt in July 2016, the AKP government dismissed about 4,000 judges and prosecutors, one-third of the country’s judiciary system, as well as 36,000 law enforcement officers, from their duties.64 They have been replaced by cadres that are close to AKP and the National Movement Party (MHP). These large-scale purges in the judiciary and police have undermined the rule of law. In 2023, Turkey ranked 115th in the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, up from 53rd in 2013.65 The Freedom House has considered Turkey a “not free” country since 2019.66
The erosion of legal norms and institutions in Turkey has created an environment in which illegal activities, including drug trafficking, can flourish with low risk of detection and punishment.67 The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor İsmail Uçar, who is believed to have a close relationship with the AKP, has publicly complained about bribery, nepotism, and other irregularities within the judicial system in recent years.68
For example, Naji Sharifi Zindasthi, an Iranian drug lord and criminal, was arrested in 2018 for murder and solicitation to murder but inexplicably released six months later. Revelations of Zindasthi’s connections to Burhan Kuzu, then a chief advisor to President Erdoğan, triggered widespread outrage in Turkeyas the news emerged that Kuzu had pressured judges to secure Zindasthi’s release. 69 Zindasthi is believed to have fled to Iran and is currently a fugitive wanted by the FBI for the murder of Iranian dissidents in the United States.70
Another example is Ayhan Bora Kaplan, whose rise as an organized crime leader has allegedly been supported by government officials.71 With a criminal history including theft and drug trafficking convictions, Kaplan rose to public notoriety after appearing at major news outlet TRT's headquarters in Ankara with a group of armed bodyguards in the early hours of the coup attempt on June 15, 2016.72 Law enforcement surveillance intercepted communications between Kaplan and then-Minister of Labor Süleyman Soylu during this incident, suggesting a potential link between Kaplan, the mafia, and high-level government officials.73
During Soylu’s subsequent tenure as Minister of Interior Affairs, 56 separate investigations against Kaplan—including allegations of forming criminal organizations, drug trafficking, document forgery, assault, and theft—were overlooked due to political intervention.74 A source within the mafia also implicated bureaucrats in offering protection to Kaplan’s organized crime group. Notably, Ankara’s Chief Public Prosecutor Yüksel Kocaman was accused of protecting Kaplan in return for bribes.75
Kaplan fell from power after Soylu was removed from office, not due to corruption, but because President Erdoğan feared his growing influence within the AKP and the police.76 Several high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Interior linked to Soylu were also removed from office.77 Simultaneously, some organized crime groups allegedly associated with Soylu faced legal action.78
The erosion of the rule of law in Turkey has also created a fertile ground for corruption and bribery, which have become essential tools of organized crime. The growing criminal landscape in Turkey has drawn international attention. Ecuador's former Interior Minister noted Turkish officials’ susceptibility to bribery and emphasized that the ease of bribing officials, especially at customs, has made Turkey increasingly attractive to criminal networks, including drug trafficking. The presence of prominent Albanian and Ecuadorian cocaine traffickers operating in Turkey further solidifies this observation.79
Mafia leaders worldwide often have close ties with politicians, and Turkey is no exception. Far-right political parties in Turkey, especially the MHP, have been known to forge such connections.80 Despite its legal status as a political party, the MHP openly acknowledges its relationships with mafia bosses. For the past decade, the MHP has been a junior partner in Turkey’s ruling coalition led by the AKP. In 2018, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli visited notorious mafia boss Alaattin Çakıcı, who was hospitalized while serving his prison sentence. Bahçeli shared this visit on the official MHP X account.81 Later, mafia bosses Çakıcı and Kürşat Yılmaz were released from jail and visited Bahçeli to thank him for his role in their early release.82 Çakıcı penned a letter of gratitude to Bahçeli and President Erdoğan upon his release from prison.83
Another mafia boss, Sedat Şahin, has also visited Bahçeli multiple times. In 2023, Şahin’s visit to Bahçeli in his office was announced by MHP Vice Chairman Semih Yalçın.84 Şahin’s brother was assassinated in 2014 over a dispute related to international cocaine trafficking, an event labeled by Turkish newspapers as “cocaine execution.”85
Another government figure who has been implicated in relations with drug-related gangs is Süleyman Soylu, former Minister of Interior. Several drug traffickers visited him in his office while he oversaw Turkey’s anti-narcotics operations. When Soylu was linked to organized crime groups, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli publicly supported him to prevent his resignation in 2020 and to halt his prosecution in 2023. Bahçeli emphasized that Soylu had fulfilled his ministerial duties from 2016 to 2023 and was a respected statesman and politician.86
When discussing the connection between cocaine trafficking, organized crime, and political parties, it is crucial to recognize its transnational dimension. Recent troubling videos have exposed links between Turkish organized crime groups, ideologically affiliated with the MHP, and international crime syndicates. In 2020, members of the Sinaloa Cartel posted videos on social media greeting their Turkish associates. These videos featured Turkish music, Turkish flags, and a salute associated with MHP’s Grey Wolves group.87 In other videos, individuals wearing balaclavas spoke Spanish with heavy Turkish accents, making the Grey Wolves salute while saying, “Saludos desde Turquía hasta México, Sinaloa. Puro cartel, puro Mayo Zambada” (“Greetings from Turkey to Mexico, Sinaloa. Pure cartel, pure Mayo Zambada”). Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, a leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, has recently been arrested by US federal authorities.88
Conversely, Sedat Peker, a leader of an organized crime group, has made serious allegations about the Turkish government, specifically concerning the son of former Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. According to Peker, Yıldırım was involved in a scheme to transport a significant amount of cocaine from Venezuela to Turkey. Yıldırım, a founding member of the AKP, has held prominent political positions, including various ministerial roles, Prime Minister, and most recently, Speaker of the Grand National Assembly from 2018 to 2019. Although Peker's allegations are referenced in the U.S. Department of State's 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on Drug and Chemical Control, they have not led to official investigations in Turkey.89
Various reports indicate a rising involvement of Turkish organized crime groups in cocaine trafficking across Latin America, similar to the activities of European and Balkan crime organizations.90 The role of Turkish criminals within other criminal circles has been noted by Europol. According to a Europol report in 2024, titled “Decoding the EU’s Most Threatening Criminal Networks,” Key Turkish figures frequently form the core of criminal networks alongside Belgian, Dutch, and German criminals. These networks are primarily involved in drug trafficking (including cocaine and cannabis) and money laundering.91 In June 2024, a multinational police operation led by the Spanish Civil Guard seized eight tons of cocaine across Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain. Europol reported that the leaders of the drug trafficking organization operated from Turkey and Dubai.92
Experts estimate that Turkey's black economy ranges from $25 to $60 billion.93, 94 Though the Turkish government under President Erdoğan has overlooked the increase of dirty money in the country, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global watchdog for money laundering and terrorist financing, has not.
FATF’s December 2019 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures report on Turkey notes that from 2013 to 2018, Turkish authorities conducted nearly 290,000 investigations into serious crimes, namely drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and fuel smuggling. However, only 198 money laundering investigations were launched during this period.95 In other words, fewer than one in 1,000 of these high-risk crime investigations led to a money laundering investigation. Although not all serious crimes warrant a money laundering investigation, this low percentage suggests that authorities may overlook money laundering in the vast majority of high-risk cases.
Ankara’s prolonged neglect of significant supervision issues within its banking and real estate sectors led to the downgrading of Turkey to the FATF grey list in 2021.109 This categorization grouped Turkey with other countries known for facilitating money laundering, including Barbados, the Cayman Islands, and the United Arab Emirates.
Inclusion on the FATF’s grey list has posed challenges for Turkey’s cross-border financial transactions, foreign investments, and international trade. Even legitimate and well-established businesses in the country may face obstacles in their financial operations due to the country’s inclusion on the grey list. When Mehmet Şimşek assumed the role of Finance Minister in June 2023, one of his primary economic objectives was to remove Turkey from the FATF's grey list.
In June 2023, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu was replaced by Ali Yerlikaya. After Soylu’s removal, multiple high-level international drug bosses were arrested. Table 3 illustrates the extent of the international criminal presence in Turkey. Notably, most if not all of the arrested drug lords were released during trials.110 The AKP government has presented these arrests as part of an unwavering fight against organized crime and drug trafficking. However, the large number of arrests of high-level drug bosses raises the question: How and why were these high-level drug lords with red notices from INTERPOL able to settle in Turkey in the first place?
In the meantime, Turkey has made improvements in risk-based anti-money laundering supervision, strengthened sanctions for anti-money laundering violations, enhanced beneficial ownership requirements, and conducted more comprehensive investigations and prosecutions related to money laundering, in accordance with perceived risks. As of February 2024, the FATF determined that Turkey has substantially completed its action plan.111 Turkey was removed from the grey list of the FATF plenary on June 28.
Global cocaine markets are rapidly expanding, driven by traditional markets in North America and emerging markets in Europe. Organized crime groups involved in cocaine trafficking are evolving their strategies to adapt to less stringent law enforcement in these emerging regions, thus reshaping the global cocaine distribution network.
This report focuses on Turkey's growing role as a hub for cocaine trafficking and organized crime, driven by political and legal changes. Since 2013, and particularly since the 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish government has weakened the rule of law by replacing key legal and law enforcement officials with loyalists. New citizenship policies implemented in 2018 have attracted wealthy criminals, facilitated money laundering, and made Turkey a safe haven for crime bosses.
As demonstrated in this report, the value of cocaine trafficked through Turkey is likely in the range of $2.9 to $5.8 billion per year. This conservative estimate is based on prices cited by the UNODC in published reports and the assumption that seizures en route to or within Turkey account for 10–20% of the total trafficked cocaine through the country. Considering the black economy created by the people employed in cocaine trafficking, the distribution networks, and the money laundered within the banking system and its coefficient effects, the actual value of this industry is likely even higher.
Turkish criminals are involved in the trade of not only cocaine, but also methamphetamine, amphetamine, heroin, and other synthetic and natural drugs. Cocaine is just one dimension of the country’s drug trade, which amounts to billions of dollars annually. Experts estimate that Turkey's black economy ranges from $25 to $60 billion. The recent spread of Turkish-manufactured weapons through Latin America suggest that the country’s illicit activities may not be limited to drug trafficking.112
Turkey was placed on the FATF grey list in 2021 but removed in 2024 due to intensified anti-money laundering efforts. Nonetheless, the root causes of the increased drug trade in Turkey remain intact. Many drug traffickers in the country were released shortly after their arrests, and trials are ongoing for others, often dragging on for years without resolution. The lack of decisive legal action allows criminal networks to continue their operations with relative impunity. Without addressing the systemic issues within the judiciary and law enforcement and closing the legal loopholes that criminals exploit, Turkey's role in the global drug trade is likely to persist and expand in the coming years.
*Retail price for 2023 is assumed to be the same as the latest available year.
**Based on 10–20% ratio.
1 Former Minister of the Interior Affairs of Ecuador, José Serrano Salgado, pointed out that alias Pipo, leader of the criminal gang Los Lobos be in Holland or Turkey and from there he would be controlling drug trafficking with the Albanian Mafia.
Ecuadorinmediato, Tweet, Twitter, March 13, 2024, https://x.com/ecuainm_oficial/status/1768063288896532482.
2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Global Report on Cocaine 2023: Local Dynamics, Global Challenges. United Nations Publications, 2023, p. 47. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/cocaine/Global_cocaine_report_2023.pdf.
3 InSight Crime. InSight Crime's 2023 Cocaine Seizure Round-Up. March 20, 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crimes-cocaine-seizure-round-up-2023/.
4 Dávalos, L. Why coca leaf, not coffee, may always be Colombia's favourite cash crop. The Conversation. March 19, 2017, https://theconversation.com/why-coca-leaf-not-coffee-may-always-be-colombias-favourite-cash-crop-74723.
5 El País, Oxygen and asphyxiation: The keys to Gustavo Petro's new drug policy for Colombia, October 4, 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-10-04/oxygen-and-asphyxiation-the-keys-to-gustavo-petros-new-drug-policy-for-colombia.html
6 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Economic and Social Council - Official Document System. 2023 https://documents.un.org/access.nsf/get?OpenAgent&DS=E/CN.7/2024/7&Lang=E
7 This severe insecurity and instability began taking root in the 1980s. Although some traditional elements of organized criminal activity, such as violence and collusion with political figures and legitimate businesses, persist, the current landscape of illegal profit-making has evolved dramatically.
8 “Explainer: Why Has Ecuador Become so Violent?,” Reuters, August 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/why-has-ecuador-become-so-violent-2023-08-10/.
9 El País. "Ecuador Uncovers Largest Stash of Cocaine in Its History: 22 Tons Hidden in a Pig Farm." El País, 25 Jan. 2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-25/ecuador-uncovers-largest-stash-of-cocaine-in-its-history-22-tons-hidden-in-a-pig-farm.html.
10 Christopher Newton and Juliana Manjarrés, “InSight Crime’s 2023 Cocaine Seizure Round-Up,” InSight Crime, March 20, 2024, http://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crimes-cocaine-seizure-round-up-2023/.
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2024 (United Nations publication, 2024), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2024.html
12 Ibid.
13 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “World Drug Report 2022, Statistical Annex” (Vienna: UNODC, 2022), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2022.html.
14 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Report on Cocaine 2023, 76, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/cocaine/Global_cocaine_report_2023.pdf.
15United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “World Drug Report 2024, Key Findings and Conclusions,” 22, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2024/WDR24_Key_findings_and_conclusions.pdf.
16 “EU Drug Markets Analysis 2024 Key Insights for Policy and Practice,” Europol, accessed August 12, 2024, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/eu-drug-markets-analysis-2024-key-insights-for-policy-and-practice.
17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2023). Global Report on Cocaine 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/cocaine/Global_cocaine_report_2023.pdf
18 European Union Drug Agency. "Cocaine – the Current Situation in Europe (European Drug Report 2024)." June 11, 2024, p. 5. https://www.euda.europa.eu/sites/default/files/pdf/31853_en.pdf?487587.
19 “Factsheet cocaïne | VAD,” September 24, 2023, https://vad.be/catalogus/factsheet-cocaine/.https://www.vad.be/assets/factsheet-cocaine
20 “Gebruik: volwassenen,” Nationale Drug Monitor, April 13, 2021, https://www.nationaledrugmonitor.nl/cocaine-gebruik-algemene-bevolking/. https://www.nationaledrugmonitor.nl/cocaine-gebruik-algemene-bevolking/
21 Antwerp emerges as the most important port for cocaine entry. The port in Antwerp, the second largest in Europe, handles 12 million containers every year. The port authorities can only check 2% of them. Exploiting this structural weakness, cartels continue to send an increasing amount of cocaine through Antwerp each year. Smugglers employ various tactics, including concealing drugs in containers filled with perishable goods or using elaborate methods such as hiding cocaine in hollowed-out logs, pineapples, or fabric. While customs officials use giant X-ray machines to inspect containers without opening them, scanning a large percentage is not feasible due to time and cost constraints. The pressure to expedite container processing further complicates the task of identifying and intercepting drug shipments. Despite receiving tips from U.S. law enforcement agents and pre-shipment scanning at Latin American ports, a substantial amount of drugs still manage to pass through uninspected containers.
Gerrit De Vynck, “A Belgian Port Seized Tons of Cocaine. Criminals Tried to Take It Back.,” Washington Post, January 20, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/20/antwerp-cocaine-cartels-ecuador/.
22 Pieterjan Huyghebaert, “Recordhoeveelheid van 110 ton cocaïne onderschept in haven van Antwerpen: grote vangst of druppel op hete plaat?,” VRT, January 10, 2023, https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2023/01/10/cocaine-belgie-nederland-douane/.
23 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and InSight Crime. The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe. February 2021, p. 61. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/cocaine-pipeline-europe/.
24 Gabriel Stargardter, “How Balkan Gangsters Became Europe’s Top Cocaine Suppliers,” Reuters, May 2, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/brazil-drugs-balkans/.
25 InSight Crime, Balkan Gangs Supervise Cocaine Trade from Colombia and Across Europe, August 17, 2021, https://insightcrime.org/news/balkan-gangs-supervise-cocaine-trade-from-colombia-and-across-europe/
26 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). Investigating criminal links between Latin America and the Balkans, October 24, 2023, https://globalinitiative.net/announcements/investigating-criminal-links-between-latin-america-and-the-balkans/
27 According to official activity reports, Turkish police seized 1,637 kilograms of cocaine in 2023, while Turkish customs seized at least 1.2 tons of cocaine in the same year.
-
The General Directorate of Security of Turkey, 2023 Administrative Activity Report of the General Directorate of Security, 2023, https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/Planlama/EGM-2023-Yili-Idare-Faaliyet-Raporu.pdf.
-
Ministry of Commerce of Turkey, 2023 Annual Activity Report of the Ministry of Commerce, 2023, https://strateji.ticaret.gov.tr/data/5daf068713b87654702d58c4/Ticaret%20Bakanl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1%202023%20Y%C4%B1l%C4%B1%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf.
28 “Drug Seizures,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-drug-seizures
29 “La red de Sito Miñanco colaboraba con la mafia turca de la cocaína y la heroína,” La Voz de Galicia, February 9, 2018, https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/galicia/2018/02/09/red-sito-minanco-colaboraba-mafia-turca-cocaina-heroina/0003_201802G9P4991.htm.
30 “Colombia decomisa 4,9 toneladas de cocaína con destino a Turquía en cargamento de plástico,” Reuters, June 9, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/americas/colombia-decomisa-49-toneladas-de-cocana-con-destino-a-turqua-en-cargamento-d-idUSKBN23G36Z/.
31 Pelin Ünker and Serdar Vardar, “El ‘Pablo Escobar de Brasil’ y la ruta turca de la cocaína,” Deutsche Welle, April 21, 2022, https://www.dw.com/es/el-pablo-escobar-de-brasil-y-la-ruta-turca-de-la-coca%C3%ADna/a-61547605
32 “Policía se decomisa 46 kilos de droga en contenedor con destino a Turquía,” El Comercio, February 7, 2022, https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/seguridad/decomiso-droga-contenedor-turquia-banano-guayaquil.html.
33 Alessandro Ford, “Turquía, puente de la cocaína entre Europa y Oriente Medio,” InSight Crime, June 30, 2022, http://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/turquia-puente-cocaina-europa-oriente-medio/
34 “Malta Seizes Record $117 Million in Cocaine En Route to Southern Turkey,” Ahval News, April 8, 2022, https://ahvalnews.com/drug-trafficking/malta-seizes-record-117-million-cocaine-en-route-southern-turkey.
35 “Italian police seize ship carrying five tonnes of cocaine destined for Turkey,” Text, Duvar English (Duvar English, July 21, 2023), https://www.duvarenglish.com/italian-police-seize-ship-carrying-five-tonnes-of-cocaine-destined-for-turkey-news-62774.
36 “‘At Least $20m’ Worth of Cocaine Headed for Turkey Seized in Peru,” Al Jazeera, March 28, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/28/peru-police-seize-20m-of-cocaine-headed-for-turkey.
37 “Detenido Un Polizón Que Transportaba Más de 100 Kilos de Cocaína Junto al Ancla de Un Buque Mercante,” Policía Nacional España, February 15, 2023, https://www.policia.es/_es/comunicacion_prensa_detalle.php?ID=15323#.
38 Juan Pablo Mejía, “Armada de Colombia incauta cocaína que se dirigía hacia Turquía,” Coosmovision, September 11, 2023, https://www.coosmovision.com/armada-de-colombia-incauta-cocaina-que-se-dirigia-hacia-turquia/.
39 Steven Ganot, “Morocco Intercepts Over 1.4 Tons of Cocaine in Major Anti-Drug Operation,” The Media Line, January 3, 2024, https://themedialine.org/mideast-daily-news/morocco-intercepts-over-1-4-tons-of-cocaine-in-major-anti-drug-operation/
40 Mustafa Özdemir, “Kolombiya’da varış yeri İstanbul olan bir konteynerde 151 kilo kokain ele geçirildi,” VOA Türkçe, May 22, 2024, https://d33vxfhewnqf4z.cloudfront.net/a/kolombiyada-varis-yeri-istanbul-olan-bir-konteynerede-151-kilo-kokain-ele-gecirildi/7622081.html.
41 “Hallan en Panamá 155 paquetes de droga en contenedores para Turquía e Italia,” Eco Tv, June 4, 2024, https://www.ecotvpanama.com/nacionales/hallan-panama-155-paquetes-droga-contenedores-turquia-e-italia-n5986641.
42 “A 3-Ton Cocaine Seizure in Venezuela Highlights Asia Trafficking Routes,” InSight Crime, September 2, 2024, http://insightcrime.org/news/a-3-ton-cocaine-seizure-in-venezuela-highlights-asia-trafficking-routes/.
43 “Drug Prices,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-drug-prices
44 Mustafa Özdemir, “‘Ortadoğu’daki kokain pazarının yüzde 20’sini Türkler kontrol ediyor,’” VOA Türkçe, June 30, 2023, https://www.voaturkce.com/a/ortadogudaki-kokain-pazarinin-yuzde-20-sini-turkler-kontrol-ediyor/7161361.html.
45 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and InSight Crime. The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe. February 2021, https://insightcrime.org/investigations/cocaine-pipeline-europe/.
46 Ryan Gingeras, “The Politics of Turkey’s Coke Connection,” New Lines Magazine, July 5, 2024, https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/the-politics-of-turkeys-coke-connection/.
47 Mitchell Prothero, “Gangsters Have a New Way of Avoiding Capture: Becoming Turkish,” VICE, April 17, 2023, https://www.vice.com/en/article/jg58jp/drug-traffickers-turkish-citizenship/.
48 Cezaî Konularda Uluslararası Adlî İş Birliği Kanunu (Law on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters), Article 11(1), https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6706.pdf.
49 Since new regulations were published in the Official Gazette on September 18, 2018 obtaining Turkish residency or citizenship for foreigners presents a relatively straightforward process, with several avenues for eligibility. Applicants can fulfill requirements by either making a minimum investment of USD 500,000 in fixed capital or acquiring property valued at least $400,000 with a resale restriction for three years. Creating employment opportunities for a minimum of 50 individuals is also a viable route. Moreover, financial options include depositing USD 500,000 in Turkish banks, purchasing government bonds or shares in real estate or venture capital investment funds, all with a condition of holding for three years. Another pathway involves contributing USD 500,000 to designated private pension funds for a similar duration.
50 Charlie Duxbury, “On Turkey, Sweden Balances NATO Aspirations against Fighting Crime at Home,” POLITICO, April 11, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-sweden-balance-nato-aspirations-fight-crime-home/.
51 Turkish Minute, “Turkey Releases Crime Boss Sought on INTERPOL Red Notice on Bail,” Turkish Minute, May 28, 2024, https://www.turkishminute.com/2024/05/28/turkey-released-crime-boss-sought-interpol-red-notice-bail/.
52 Lazar Berman, “Mossad: Iran-Backed Criminal Networks behind Attacks on Israeli Embassies in Europe,” The Times of Israel, accessed August 12, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossad-iran-backed-criminal-networks-behind-attacks-on-israeli-embassies-in-europe/.
53 Nicolas Bourcier, “Turkey: The Whistle Blows in Narco Land,” March 4, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/04/turkey-the-whistle-blows-in-narco-land_6582161_4.html.
54 Ali Yerlikaya, Tweet, Twitter, November 18, 2023, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1725744451551674466.
55 Samir Kajosevic, “Montenegrin Alleged Drug Gang Boss Reported Killed in Turkey,” Balkan Insight, September 9, 2022, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/09/09/montenegrin-alleged-drug-gang-boss-reported-killed-in-turkey/.https://balkaninsight.com/2022/09/09/montenegrin-alleged-drug-gang-boss-reported-killed-in-turkey
56 Timur Soykan, Baron İstilası (Istanbul: Kırmızı Kedi, February 27, 2024)
57 Ibid.
58 Bazi Varliklarin Ekonomiye Kazandirilmasi Hakkinda Genel Tebliğ (Seri No: 1) ("Communiqué on the Transfer of Certain Assets to the Economy (Serial No: 1)"), Official Gazette, August 9, 2022
https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2022/08/20220809-8.htm
59 “Komançero: Hakan Ayık yakalandı, çetenin lideri suç ortaklarını nasıl yanlışlıkla ele verdi?,” BBC News Türkçe, November 2, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cx0e24wd327o.
60 “NZ-Born Comancheros ‘Supreme Commander’ Arrested in Turkey - Police,” NZ Herald, January 15, 2023, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/new-zealand-born-comancheros-supreme-commander-duax-ngakuru-reportedly-arrested-in-turkey/4JNMVYIKS5AMTC3DMQGH74INQ4/
61 Sercan Meriç, “Suçlular Ada’sı,” Birgün, March 27, 2022, https://www.birgun.net/haber/suclular-ada-si-381913.
62 “Türk baron mahkemeye gitmezse mülkleri tek tek satılacak,” Hürriyet, April 2, 2020, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turk-baron-mahkemeye-gitmezse-mulkleri-tek-tek-satilacak-41484650.
63 Nick McKenzie Ilanbey Joel Tozer, Sumeyya, “How We Tracked down Australia’s Most Wanted Man to His Glamorous New Life,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 4, 2021, https://www.smh.com.au/national/how-we-tracked-down-australia-s-most-wanted-man-to-his-glamorous-new-life-20210601-p57x7w.html.
64 Muhammed Boztepe, “FETÖ Ile Iltisaklı Oldukları Gerekçesiyle Emniyet ve Jandarmadan 36 Bin 176 Kişi Ihraç Edildi,” Anadolu Ajansı, July 12, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/15-temmuz-darbe-girisimi/feto-ile-iltisakli-olduklari-gerekcesiyle-emniyet-ve-jandarmadan-36-bin-176-kisi-ihrac-edildi/1907651
65 “2023 Corruption Perceptions Index - Turkey,” Transparency International, January 30, 2024, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023.
66 “Turkey: Freedom in the World 2019 Country Report,” Freedom House, accessed August 12, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2019.
67 Mahmut Cengiz, "Perspective: Turkiye Forges New Routes for Latin American Cocaine Destined for Europe," Small Wars Journal, May 28, 2024, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/perspective-turkiye-forges-new-routes-latin-american-cocaine-destined-europe.
68 Turkish Minute, “Prosecutor Reveals Corruption within Judiciary in Letter to Turkey’s Top Judicial Body,” Turkish Minute, October 13, 2023, https://www.turkishminute.com/2023/10/13/prosecutor-reveal-corruption-within-judiciary-letter-to-turkeys-top-judicial-body/.
69 Devrim Gurkan, “The Burhan Kuzu Incident: A Story That Will Make Novelists Jealous,” ankahaber.net, accessed August 12, 2024, https://ankahaber.net/AnkaReview/Columnists/the_burhan_kuzu_incident_a_story_that_will_make_novelists_jealous_50145.
70 “Naji Sharifi Zindashti,” Person, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed August 12, 2024, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/counterintelligence/naji-sharifi-zindashti.https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/counterintelligence/naji-sharifi-zindashti
71 Alican Uludağ, “14 soruda Ayhan Bora Kaplan krizi,” Deutsche Welle, May 20, 2024, https://www.dw.com/tr/14-soruda-ayhan-bora-kaplan-krizi/a-69090237.
72 “Ayhan Bora Kaplan’dan TRT önündeki fotoğrafa çarpıcı yanıt,” Sözcü Gazetesi, April 16, 2024, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/ayhan-bora-kaplan-dan-trt-onundeki-fotografa-carpici-yanit-p39813.
73 Alican Uludağ, “Bahçeli’nin Soylu mesajı İçişleri’nde nasıl yankılandı?,” Deutsche Welle, September 29, 2023, https://www.dw.com/tr/bah%C3%A7elinin-soylu-mesaj%C4%B1-i%CC%87%C3%A7i%C5%9Flerinde-nas%C4%B1l-yank%C4%B1land%C4%B1/a-66956620.
74 Alican Uludağ, “Mafya-Emniyet-Yargı üçgeninde Ayhan Bora Kaplan dosyası,” Deutsche Welle, April 14, 2024, https://www.dw.com/tr/ayhan-bora-kaplan-torbac%C4%B1l%C4%B1ktan-i%C5%9F-insanl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1na-bir-mafya-hikayesi/a-68476109.
75 Tolga Şardan, “Mahkemeye sunulan 199 sayfalık polis raporunda skandal ifadeler: Yargıtay üyesi Yüksel Kocaman’ın villasındaki mobilyaları Ayhan Bora Kaplan mı yaptırdı!,” T24, accessed August 12, 2024, https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/tolga-sardan-buyutec/mahkemeye-sunulan-199-sayfalik-polis-raporunda-skandal-ifadeler-yargitay-uyesi-yuksel-kocaman-in-villasindaki-mobilyalari-ayhan-bora-kaplan-mi-yaptirdi,45146.
76 Murat Yetkin, “Akar ve Soylu neden Bakan kalamadı? Ve Erdoğan’ın yeni A-takımı,” Yetkin Report (blog), June 14, 2023, https://yetkinreport.com/2023/06/14/akar-ve-soylu-neden-bakan-kalamadi-ve-erdoganin-yeni-a-takimi/.
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80 Yesilgöz, Yücel, and Frank Bovenkerk. "The Turkish Mafia and the State." In Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli, 585-601. Dordrecht: Springer, 2004.
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82 Avşar Seyhan, “Çakıcı’dan Bahçeli’ye ziyaret: Af gündemde,” Halk TV, August 29, 2022, https://halktv.com.tr/halktv-ozel/cakicidan-bahceliye-ziyaret-af-gundemde-690509h.
83 “İnfaz yasası ile tahliye edilen Alaattin Çakıcı, Bahçeli ve Erdoğan’a teşekkür mektubu yazdı,” euronews, April 17, 2020, https://tr.euronews.com/2020/04/17/infaz-yasas-ile-tahliye-edilen-alaattin-cak-c-bahceli-ve-erdogan-a-tesekkur-mektubu-yazd.
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86 Devlet Bahçeli, Tweet, Twitter, September 25, 2023, https://x.com/dbdevletbahceli/status/1706249209517662460.
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89 United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00767-INCSR-2022-Vol-1.pdf.
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102 Ali Yerlikaya, “669,” Tweet, Twitter, December 13, 2023, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1734803882268565690.
103 Ali Yerlikaya, “777,” Tweet, Twitter, December 15, 2023, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1735527921559695729.
104 Ali Yerlikaya, “159,” Tweet, Twitter, December 19, 2023, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1736974907114742159.
105 Mustafa Ünal Uysal, “Uluslararası Uyuşturucu Ticareti Yapan Zafer Ramadan Mersin’de Yakalandı,” Anadolu Ajansı, December 22, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/uluslararasi-uyusturucu-ticareti-yapan-zafer-ramadan-mersinde-yakalandi/3089536.
106 Ali Yerlikaya, “171,” Tweet, Twitter, December 27, 2023, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1739875263897330171.
107 Ali Yerlikaya, “699,” Tweet, Twitter, February 3, 2024, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1753648465698029699.
108 Ali Yerlikaya, “963,” Tweet, Twitter, January 16, 2024, https://x.com/AliYerlikaya/status/1747123027744071963.
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112 Mustafa Özdemir, “Güney Amerika’da Türk silahlarının yasadışı kullanımı artıyor,” VOA Türkçe, June 9, 2023, https://www.voaturkce.com/a/guney-amerika-turk-silahlarinin-yasadisi-kullanimi-artiyor/7130283.html.
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