Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia continues puzzling political scientists even after years. In many ways, it had been to contrary to Ankara’s rational calculations. S-400 systems were not interoperable with NATO’s defense and radar systems. It does not serve to Turkey’s strategic needs. It has also strained Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies and caused a confidence crisis towards Turkey within the alliance. To make matters worse, because of S-400 presence in its soils, the United States removed Turkey from F-35 program which has compromised the future of Turkey’s Air Forces and cost billions of dollars to the Turkish defense industry. Besides, Ankara has not even activated the system for years. Then what does explain this politically, economically, and strategically costly decision that has not brought any added value to Turkey’s military power or defense?
In their article, titled ‘Symbolic Amplification and Suboptimal Weapons Procurement: Explaining Turkey’s S-400 Program,’ Lisel Hintz and David E. Banks argues that S-400s, thanks to the government propaganda, have turned into a political symbol of defiance against the U.S. and strategic autonomy so much that President Erdogan could not retract his S-400 decision. Hintz and Banks find the explanations that international theories proves insufficient to solve the S-400 puzzle. For sure, from a realist perspective, every state has a sovereign right to take necessary precautions for its security. Yet, S-400s do not seem to meet a NATO army’s strategic needs. Put aside the fact that they are not compatible with the weapons in the Turkish military’s inventory, Russia and its allies are Turkey’s major geopolitical rivals in the region. Syria is equipped with Russian jets and S-300s, that Turkey has had issues of airspace violations. Turkish downing of a Russian jet in 2015 came after consistent violations of Turkish airspace by the Russian jets.
Another explanation relies on Turkey’s ambitious diplomatic bargaining tactics. Using brinkmanship to increase the pressure on the United States, Ankara might have wanted to extract some concessions about the US support to the Syrian Kurds and the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, an anti-Erdogan leader living in the US. Nevertheless, Hintz and Banks note that Ankara has maintained its position regarding S-400s although the bargain collapsed.
The authors remind that occasionally domestic interest groups may influence policy makers to choose ‘suboptimal’ options in foreign policy. Nevertheless, there are no such interest groups in Ankara when it comes to S-400s. As a matter of fact, being expelled from F-35 program, which S-400 purchase caused, have costed billions of US dollars to the Turkish defense industry. Thus, it is possible to assume that the interest groups might have lobbied against, not for, S-400s.
Also, S-400s have not brought any international prestige or status to Turkey. S-400s are known as capable air defense systems, but unlike nuclear weapons, ‘the S-400 is a distinctly unglamorous weapon associated with a component of military power’ (834).
Instead, the authors suggest that President Erdogan and his government have become a victim of their own political symbol. Erdogan and AKP leaders promoted S-400s as the icon of national cause. Ambiguity and polysemy of the symbol allowed President Erdogan to consolidate his rule and control by establishing a coalition with a wide spectrum of groups from right to left and from Islamists to seculars. According to the Turkish government, S-400s represented Turkey’s national independence, strategic autonomy, ‘regional counterhegemony,’ and defiance of the United States which allegedly attempted to overthrow the government on 2016 coup attempt and partners with the Kurdish separatists in northern Syria. This nationalist and populist symbol received a wholehearted acceptance from smaller partners of the governing coalition – partners like Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), left-wing nationalists (Vatan Partisi and Perinçek group), retired generals, and other tele-nationalists. Even the opposition party embraced this symbol. They have not only accepted the S-400s as a national symbol, but they have amplified this symbol through national media too.
However, the success of this symbol as a propaganda tool in domestic politics narrowed Erdogan’s maneuvering room in foreign policy. In other words, the nationalists, both from right and left, cornered Erdogan with his own weapon. Hintz and Banks wrote that reversing the S-400 decision could cost Erdogan his nationalists constituencies. Given that ‘popular legitimacy is an integral part of [Erdogan’s] political survival,’ he is sensitive to any possibility of a backlash. Thus, he has stuck to the S-400 symbol even if it has become very costly for the country. To support their argument, authors remind how Erdogan tested the waters about a potential policy change but backpedaled later. ‘Crete model,’ which was raised by former Defense Minister, Hulusi Akar, to reach a negotiated solution with the United States about the S-400s, drew rebuff from nationalist circles (853).
Hintz and Banks offer a sound theoretical ground and coherent explanation for Turkey’s decision to buy S-400s. It well explains the instrumentality of S-400s for Erdogan in domestic politics and how Erdogan’s domestic concerns shape his foreign policy decisions. It also explains how he mobilized such a broad coalition under his leadership through a symbol. Nevertheless, there are still some points that need to be discussed about why he failed backpedaling.
First, legitimacy cost and its importance compared to the issues of ‘high politics’ raises questions. After all, Erdogan is a highly charismatic leader whose popular image has proved quite resistant to policy reversals or unpopular decisions. Its well-known instances occurred in Turkish-Israeli relations. Despite his populist, agitative, and anti-Semitic rhetoric against Israel, he did not hesitate to foster friendly relations with Tel Aviv when he sees an opportunity. Although he fervently supported Mavi Marmara, 2010 civil organization to lift Gaza blockade, he publicly disassociated himself from the incident when he wanted normalize relations with Israel in 2016. Most recently, he keeps trade flowing although he strongly condemns Netanyahu government because of ongoing military operations and civil destruction in Gaza. In this respect, it is possible to say that thanks to Erdogan’s personal charisma, he can take unpopular decisions when he feels necessary. Hence, he could have deployed a kind of slowly killing tactic for S-400s without much cost to his authority.
The second issue is about the symbols’ coalition-making power. No doubt, the S-400s have transformed into a national cause that united Islamists, nationalists, and secularists. Nevertheless, it is a different thing to say that reversal of S-400s was a gamechanger for Erdogan’s governing coalition. As tele-nationalists criticized Akar’s ‘Crete model,’ a reversal of S-400 decision might have caused some discontent among Erdogan’s allies but not break the alliance. Internal power distribution keeps this alliance alive rather than foreign policy rhetoric or symbols. So indeed, there are many other frictions between Erdogan and MHP or Vatan Partisi, but partners still maintain the current coalition. Therefore, although the S-400s were very useful instruments for Erdogan to consolidate his power coalition, a potential S-400 reversal’s disruptive capacity needs more proof.
The political symbols’ temporal dimension is another point to be discussed. The symbols do have importance within a social context and period. From 2016 to 2020, S-400s were highly popular issue in the post-coup Turkish political landscape. Yet, in the last few years, they seem to lose their importance and prestige for the Turkish people as more important issues have come up, like economic crisis and natural disasters. Within this scope, it would not be far-fetched to assume that the political cost of S-400 reversal has decreased for Erdogan in time. However, the Turkish government is still adamant on its S-400 decision. As the US Congress approved F-16 sale, the Turkish-American relations have witnessed a recuperation recently. State Department even suggested Turkey’s return to F-35 program if Ankara changes its policy about S-400s. Nevertheless, Erdogan rejected this offer, sticking to his unpacked Russian air defense system.
In this respect, although Hintz and Banks’ article provides a strong theoretical background to understand Ankara’s S-400 decision, the issue still provides opportunities for new studies.
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