Ekrem Imamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul from the opposition Republican Party, has announced his candidacy for Turkey’s presidential election. More than 110 parliamentarians have already endorsed his bid. This early announcement raises questions regarding the urgency: with three years remaining until the scheduled elections, such an announcement is highly atypical in Turkey. Imamoğlu has his reasons for this move.
Imamoğlu has always been considered the frontrunner in the upcoming presidential race. To undermine his bid, the government has been digging into his past. Meanwhile, charges against him are mounting, ranging from corruption to abetting terrorism. New accusations emerge almost weekly. The latest concerns the authenticity of his university diploma. Following claims that his bachelor's degree is fraudulent—and a report from the Council of Higher Education—the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office has summoned Imamoğlu to provide a statement on February 26.
Notably, he is not alone in facing a series of serious charges in recent weeks. Political tensions in Turkey are increasing as legal actions and arrests target opposition groups, business leaders, and activists.
Mass arrests targeting different groups
Political repression in Turkey is cranking up. In February, the Turkish government conducted mass arrests targeting various segments of society. Last week, top figures of TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industry and Business Association), Ömer Aras and Orhan Turan, were detained after criticizing the government. According to TÜSİAD, the organization represents companies accounting for 85% of Turkey’s total foreign trade volume (excluding energy imports), 50% of private sector employment, and 80% of corporate tax contributions. The arrest of these top executives has been widely perceived as an act of intimidation aimed at the nation’s leading business community.
Turkish police have also detained 353 individuals as part of an investigation into Maydonoz Doner, a well-known Turkish döner restaurant chain, for alleged links to the Gulen movement. The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) announced that a court order has designated it as the trustee for 21 companies operating under the 'Maydonoz Doner' brand. These companies are accused of employing individuals dismissed from government positions under the KHKs and thereby 'financing terrorism.'
Similarly, a judge ordered the release of Manager Ayşe Barım, who had been arrested in connection with the Gezi Park investigation. However, Barım was immediately rearrested, and the Board of Judges and Prosecutors launched an investigation into the judge who ordered her release. The Erdoğan government characterizes the Gezi movement as an uprising and a coup attempt. Osman Kavala remains incarcerated on charges—including alleged leadership of the Gezi movement—while the European Court of Human Rights has determined that the charges against him are politically motivated.
The Kurdish issue remains the sole political arena with some prospect for improvement. Nevertheless, the Turkish government continues unabated in appointing trustees to cities governed by the DEM Party. Lastly, on February 15, Van municipality Mayor Abdullah Zeydan was removed from office on terrorism charges. Such actions have led many within the Kurdish community to question the sincerity of the government’s so-called Kurdish opening.
While there is still a genuine possibility that Abdullah Öcalan’s upcoming statement in March could have an impact, most people remain skeptical and do not expect it to produce meaningful results. In this regard, Turkish police detained 282 individuals connected with an investigation into the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK), a left-leaning pro-Kurdish political party. According to opposition parliamentarian İskender Bayhan, the investigation now encompasses 6,000 people, including 1,600 residents of Istanbul, many of whom may face detention in the near future. In response, the DEM Party has heavily criticized the government, asserting that these arrests and the removal of elected mayors are efforts to end hopes for peace in the region.
Early Presidential Elections and Political Uncertainties
Many political scientists regard Turkey as a semi-authoritarian state, where the playing field is skewed in favor of the government—whether in elections, media, judiciary, or campaign activities—yet the opposition still retains a possibility of success. However, semi-authoritarian regimes are often politically unstable during highly contested electoral periods.
The presidential elections in Turkey are normally scheduled for 2028. Yet, constitutional changes to ensure Erdoğan’s candidacy are seen as unlikely, making a parliamentary decision on early elections the preferred path. The opposition seeks to hold a presidential race as early as 2026, before the AKP has a chance to improve economic conditions that have harmed its constituents. The AKP understandably prefers a more favorable timeline. According to the pro-government Türkiye newspaper, the AKP now entertains 2027 as a possible date. The newspaper reports that AKP is working to secure 360 parliamentary seats to call for early elections, which would enable President Erdoğan to run for another term. Recent efforts include attracting independent and opposition MPs to join the party, with speculation that members from the Gelecek, DEVA, and İYİ parties may switch sides.
While the Kurdish opening would provide a temporary respite, political tension in Turkey will remain high. The frail health of Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the MHP, also presents a concern for the AKP. Given that the MHP is a highly centralized political organization, any change in leadership could have immediate repercussions on the governing coalition.
This growing political instability also shakes business confidence. The increased legal uncertainties, mass arrests, and shifting electoral timelines create an unpredictable environment for investors. Both domestic and international investors may hesitate to commit long-term capital investment, further straining Turkey’s economic outlook.
Imamoğlu might be disqualified from the presidential race through a political ban. The sheer volume of charges against him may well lay the groundwork for his removal from office, both legally and, just as importantly, psychologically. Unlike many Kurdish mayors or politicians who have faced imprisonment, Imamoğlu might avoid incarceration; however, his fate seems predetermined. His removal will escalate tensions and may undermine any other democratic gains within the country.
Imamoğlu and other leaders of the CHP are acutely aware that he might be barred from the presidential race. As a preemptive measure, he declared his candidacy for the presidency. While he might not secure a favorable ruling in the judiciary, his candidacy ensures that the charges against him will be widely perceived as political, shifting the battle to the political arena—the only 'court' where he has a chance to prevail.
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