On his return flight from the USA after attending the NATO Summit, Turkish President Erdoğan informed journalists that he had instructed Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to arrange a meeting with his Syrian counterpart, President Bashar al-Assad. Despite Erdoğan’s persistent efforts — and mediation from Russia and Iraq to mend fences between Ankara and Damascus — the Syrian leader remains reluctant to engage in a personal meeting. On June 15, President Assad announced that he would only meet Erdoğan if the core issues between Ankara and Damascus were addressed. Assad emphasized, "What is the basis for the meeting? Would it be ending the reasons for the problem, which are supporting terrorism and withdrawing from Syrian lands? ... This is the core of the problem."
Assad’s reference to supporting terrorism primarily pertains to Turkey’s ongoing support for the Syrian insurgents. More than 5 million Syrians who have escaped Assad’s regime reside in northern Syria under Turkey’s sphere of influence. The Syrian opposition’s tenuous presence in the north heavily depends on Turkey’s willingness to use force against the Syrian army. The Turkish army confronted the Syrian army in the past when it advanced into northern Syria into de-escalation zones established by Russia, Syria, and Turkey.
Turkey and its affiliated armed organizations, such as the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, control approximately 10% of Syria’s 185,000 km² of internationally recognized territory. To provide perspective, this area is slightly less than twice the size of Lebanon, which spans 10,452 km². If possible, Assad aims to complete what he previously attempted: to purge the Syrian insurgents from the north once and for all.
The Turkish government has no intention of complying with Damascus's demands. On June 14, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan asserted that Ankara would continue to support the Syrian opposition, stating, "There is no question of abandoning them." Fidan, as the former Chief of Intelligence, is one of the architects of Turkey’s defunct Syria policy. Turkey continues to condition its withdrawal on a political settlement of the Syrian civil war, the inclusion of the Syrian opposition in this process, and the necessary arrangements for the return of Syrian refugees. Nonetheless, as evident in the remarks of Assad, Damascus labels the presence of the Turkish troops in Syria as occupation and stipulates their withdrawal as a prerequisite for normalization.
It seems that the sides mainly agree on the principle that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria pose a fatal threat to them. The SDF, supported by the United States, controls slightly more than 25% of Syria’s territory, including its oil-rich provinces, and 3 million people. Syria seeks to reclaim its lost territory, while the Turkish security apparatus fears that an independent Kurdish entity could set a precedent for the region.
Erdoğan’s efforts to normalize Turkey’s relations with Syria might be partially related to enhancing a 30 km deep buffer zone on its southern borders. Turkey is about to accomplish the Iraqi leg of this target by thrusting deep into the country this summer, to the dismay of the Iraqi authorities. Some unverified reports suggest that Ankara and Damascus have made certain progress in coordinating an offensive on the eastern front. The parties are allegedly negotiating the modus operandi and timing of a military operation.
Should Ankara and Damascus manage to temporarily set aside their core differences—an unlikely prospect—a coordinated effort to reverse the gains of the SDF could ensue.The US stance against normalizing relations with the Assad regime also complicates matters, with American troops still present in eastern Syria. The Biden administration objects to any further Turkish intervention in the region. A new Trump administration, however, will most likely have diminished interest in Syria, as in Ukraine. If Trump were re-elected in November, which will probably be the case, Erdoğan might find greater maneuvering room in eastern Syria.